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The effects of active labour market policies (ALMP) on individual employment chances
and earnings are evaluated by nonparametric instrumental variables based on Swiss
administrative data with detailed re-gional information. Using an exogenous variation
in the participation probabilities across fairly autonomous regional units (cantons)
generated by the federal government, we identify the effects of ALMP by comparing
individuals living in the same local labour market but in different cantons. Taking
account of small sample problems occurring in IV estimation, our results suggest that
ALMP increases individual employment probabilities by about 15% in the short term
for a weighted subpopulation of compliers.
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In many empirical applications, geographic borders are exploited as an instrumental variable to uncover the 
effects of policy interventions. Card and Krueger (1994), Holmes (1998), Black (1999) and Pence (2003) 
use the U.S. state or district borders to estimate the effects of the minimum wage on employment, of right-
to-work laws on manufacturing activity, of school quality on housing prices and of foreclosure laws on 
mortgage loan size, respectively. Policies change abruptly as one crosses a state border, but the economic 
environment changes only little within areas close to it. In other words, crossing the border changes the 
impact of the policy or the likelihood of being subject to the policy, but has no direct effect on individual 
outcomes in the absence of the policy. Thus, the border acts like an instrumental variable. If there are many 
state borders, separate effects are identified for each border, because – without further homogeneity as-
sumptions - the instrument is valid only locally. The standard approach consists in specifying a linear IV 
model to implicitly aggregate these different heterogeneous local effects into a single parameter. In this 
paper, we introduce a different, nonparametric approach for aggregating local effects and for coping with 
weak instruments. The latter problem is of particular concern in many applications where the policy change 
accompanied with crossing a state border affects only a fraction of the population. The proposed estimator 
is used to evaluate Swiss active labour market policies. 
Switzerland is a small country with fairly autonomous administrative regions and runs an extensive active 
labour market policy to counteract unemployment. With short commuting times and a good transport infra-
structure, local labour markets are integrated across regional borders and individuals residing on opposite 
sides close to the border essentially live in the same economic environment. Opportunities for wage arbi-
trage through relocating instead of commuting hardly exist. When an employed person becomes unem-
ployed, however, a regional difference in active labour market programmes matter. Although the labour 
market programmes are largely similar throughout the country, treatment incidence is not. This pattern can 
be explained by regional minimum quota requirements. They were enacted by the Swiss federal govern-
ment to speed up the local implementation of the reform. As a result the probability of participating in ac-
tive labour market programmes varies between regions. This exposes individuals within the same local 2 
labour market to different treatment probabilities when they become unemployed. Our identification strat-
egy consists in identifying neighbourhoods on both sides of a regional border that belong to the same local 
labour market. Living on one or the other side of the border acts as an instrument for estimating average 
effects of active labour market programmes. The conditions for identification are discussed in detail in the 
paper. To our knowledge, such an approach has not yet been used to evaluate labour market programmes. 
In applications of this kind, when allowing for heterogeneous effects, two problems are likely to occur. 
First, there might be many regional borders with corresponding treatment effects, which are all very impre-
cisely estimated because of the small number of observations in the border region. Second, the imprecision 
of the estimates is often exacerbated by weak instruments and the well-known poor finite sample properties 
of conventional IV estimators. In our application, for example, the weakness of the instrument is visible in 
that the treatment probability often changes by less than 5 percentage points across the border. To cope with 
these problems, the paper advances two methodological contributions: We propose a way to deal (1) with 
weak instruments in this specific context, and (2) to aggregate the separate local effects into a single effect 
to discern the main pattern from the many noisy estimates for the different borders. 
The first contribution regards the choice of the IV estimator in estimating treatment effects with a poten-
tially weak binary instrument, which has not been analysed specifically in the literature so far. Although the 
Wald (1940) estimator is used in almost all empirical applications when the instrument is binary, it is sus-
ceptible to weak instruments and can perform poorly in finite samples. In our Monte Carlo simulations, we 
find that the estimator proposed by Fuller (1977) is superior to the Wald estimator in this situation.  
The second contribution is related to summarize the effects coming from a number of noisy estimates. Ex-
amining the effects separately for each regional border may provide useful information on their heterogene-
ity. More often, however, it will lead to the conclusion that all estimates are insignificant. Drawing any 
conclusions from the statistical analysis then requires aggregation of the various estimates to obtain a sum-
mary measure. We propose a nonparametric and versatile approach to combine the different effects to an 
aggregated local average treatment effect. The Fuller estimator seems to be particularly suited for its esti-
mation, because its finite-sample moments exist. 3 
Applying this approach, we estimate the aggregated local average treatment effect of Swiss active labour 
market policies on subsequent employment chances. This is the treatment effect for compliers, i.e. for the 
specific subpopulation that is responsive to changes in the minimum quota. We find positive and significant 
aggregate effects on individual employment probabilities of about 10 percentage-points. 
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, the Swiss active labour market policies and the origins of 
the regional variation in treatment intention intensity are described. Section 3 introduces the aggregated 
local average treatment effect. Section 4 describes the implementation for Switzerland, and Section 5 gives 
the estimation results. Section 6 concludes. Several appendices contain additional material.  
2  The Swiss labour market and active labour market policies  
2.1  Regional employment offices, unemployment insurance, and active labour policies 
Until the recession of the early 1990s, unemployment was very low in Switzerland, a small country with 26 
different administrative regions, called cantons. With the recession, the unemployment rate rose rapidly to 
5% and triggered a comprehensive revision of the federal unemployment insurance act. This revision, 
which became effective partly in January 1996 and partly in January 1997, introduced active labour market 
programmes (ALMP) on a large scale. Although different in some details, the main components of the 
Swiss ALMP can be found in various programmes in the USA, UK and Germany as well. Programmes can 
be grouped into three categories: a) Training programmes range from basic skills courses, language 
courses, computer courses to specific work-related training,
1 with a usual duration of 1 week to 3 months 
and are carried out by private education providers; b) Employment programmes are temporary job creation 
schemes and consist of provisional or project work for about 3-6 months in the public administration or 
other public institutions (hospitals, old people's homes, nursing homes, schools, and kindergartens) or in 
private not-for-profit institutions (e.g. charities, cultural, environmental, recycling organisations). c) Tem-
porary wage subsidies (Zwischenverdienst) is a programme rather unique to Switzerland and is a subsidy 
for temporary jobs in the regular labour market. Whereas employment programmes have to be extraordi-
                                                           
1   Business and trade training, manufacturing and technical training, etc. 4 
nary, i.e. not competing with regular jobs in the private or public sector, temporary wage subsidies are for 
jobs in the regular labour market. The subsidy consists of 80% of the pay difference to the previous earn-
ings and is paid to the unemployed person. The subsidy can be granted for up to one year, with an average 
duration of about 4 months.
2 During participation in ALMP the unemployed must continue her job search 
activities and accept any reasonable job offer.  
With the reform, benefit entitlement was prolonged to two years, but benefit payments were made condi-
tional on willingness to participate in labour market programmes. This activation principle empowered the 
caseworker to assign an unemployed at any time to any programme provided that participation is expected 
to be beneficial to her employability. Non-cooperation by the unemployed person can be (and often is) 
sanctioned through the suspension of benefits.
3 
Another element of the reform was the consolidation of the 3000 municipal unemployment offices into 
about 150 regional employment offices (REO), supervised by 26 cantonal centres (CC). These centres con-
tract private and public organisations for providing programmes, compile a catalogue of courses and pro-
grammes offered by the contracted providers and seek to ensure that a sufficient number of programme 
places can be offered as demanded by the REO. The CC have substantial autonomy in administrating and 
implementing active labour market programmes. The REOs are geographically organised, each REO serv-
ing several municipalities. For each unemployed there is one unique REO defined by her place of residence. 
They cannot change their assigned REO other than by moving to another municipality. Exceptions are the 
city centres of Zurich and Geneva, which are served by several REOs. 
2.2  The minimum quota as an instrument 
Since Swiss cantons enjoying a high degree of autonomy might have been slow to implement the new fed-
eral policies, they were obliged by law to fill a minimum number of places in active labour market pro-
                                                           
2  Officially, temporary wage subsidies is not labelled an active labour market programme. More details on Swiss 
active labour market policies can be found in Gerfin and Lechner (2002), Gerfin, Lechner and Steiger (2002), and 
Lalive, van Ours and Zweimüller (2000). 
3   The obligation to be willing to participate in ALMP starts from the first day of unemployment. 5 
grammes per year. For the year 1998, the minimum was 25'000 year-places
4 and was distributed across the 
cantons according to the formula 
  () 1996 1996 12'500 population share unemployment share ⋅+ , 
where population share is the fraction of the population living in the respective canton as of 1996 and un-
employment share is the average number of unemployment benefit recipients in the period April 1996 to 
March 1997 in the respective canton relative to the total for Switzerland. 
The costs of active labour market programmes and of their administration generally are borne by the federal 
unemployment insurance funds.
5 The cantons pay a very small lump sum contribution of 3000 Swiss Francs 
(CHF) per year-place for their assigned minimum quota. They can reduce this lump sum payment by up to 
25% if the average unit costs of the purchased programme slots are below the national average within de-
fined programme categories. No financial contribution has to be paid for places filled beyond the required 
minimum.
6 On the other hand, cantons which fill less than the required minimum number of year-places, 
have to compensate the federal unemployment insurance funds with 20% of the unemployment benefits 
payed to those persons to whom no ALMP could be offered.
7 Hence, there are financial and political incen-
tives for the cantons to meet their quota. In fact, they were encouraged to provide even more ALMP places. 
The formula for the calculation of the quota for 1998 was codified in November 1996, and in October 1997 
the minimum quotas for 1998, as given in Table 2.1, were proclaimed.
8 This formula for the computation of 
the minimum quota induced regional variation in treatment (participation) intention. Relative to the number 
of unemployed persons, the quota was rather high in cantons with a low unemployment rate in 1996 be-
cause 50% of the quota was distributed according to the population share. 
                                                           
4   A year-place corresponds to 220 programme days.  
5   Art. 92 AVIG (Arbeitslosenversicherungsgesetz), Art. 122a, 122b AVIV (Arbeitslosenversicherungsverordnung). 
6   Art. 72c (AVIG) and Art. 98b (AVIV).  
7   Art. 72a (AVIG) and Art. 98b (AVIV). 
8   Art. 72b (AVIG), Art. 99, 99a (AVIV). Regulation in Amtliche Sammlung AS 1996 3071, AS 1997 2415. See also 
Stauffer, 1998. 6 
Consider the situation of the management of the cantonal and the regional employment offices in the begin-
ning of 1998 for planning their strategy in providing active labour market programmes. In the fourth and 
fifth column in Table 2.1, the number of registered unemployed in January 1998 and the ratio of the quota 
to the number of unemployed in January 1998 is given. Suppose the management of the cantonal employ-
ment offices forecasted that the number of unemployed would remain constant during the whole year. 
Then, in cantons such as Uri (UR), Schwyz (SZ), Obwalden (OW), Nidwalden (NW), Appenzell (AR&AI), 
Glarus (GL) and StGall (SG) with high ratios of the quota to the number of unemployed, the management 
was under pressure to make sure that many of the relatively few unemployed persons will be assigned to 
active labour market programmes. In the cantons Zurich (ZH), Solothurn (SO), Schaffhausen (SH), Ticino 
(TI), Vaud (VD), Neuchâtel (NE), Geneva (GE) and Jura (JU), on the other hand, the relative quota was 
much lower and the administration was under less pressure to fill this quota. Probably though, the manage-
ment did not assume that the number of unemployed would remain constant throughout 1998 and their 
forecasts may have varied between the cantons. Indeed, the number of unemployed decreased by about 
30% during the year and this decrease differed between the cantons: from -22% in Zug (ZG) to -66% in 
AppenzellInner-Rhodes (AI). These differential developments even exacerbated the differences in the quota 
per unemployed, as cantons where there were relatively few unemployed in January (relative to the quota) 
experienced larger decreases in the number of unemployed, than cantons where there were relatively many 
unemployed. Due to these developments, the ratios of the quota to the number of unemployed at the middle 
or at the end of 1998 (column six in Table 2.1) were even more pronounced. If the cantonal authorities 
forecasted these trends even roughly, the pressure on those cantons with a high quota per unemployed (with 
respect to the January figures) was even larger, while it was even less in cantons with a low quota in Janu-
ary. Hence, the quota per unemployed in January 1998 indicates the intensity of the pressure to which the 
local administrations were subjected to assign a sufficient number of unemployed persons to labour market 
programmes. 7 
Table 2.1: Minimum quotas and number of unemployed 
















Total  25'000  25'000    182'492  13.7  20.1 26'934  139'658  19.3 
ZH 4'258 4'325      33'802  12.8  18.0 3'976  27'985  14.2 
BE 2'947 2'966      19'591  15.1  25.4 3'665  14'151  25.9 
LU 1'000 1'040     6'885  15.1  23.4 1'187 4'967 23.9 
UR 64  89      394  22.6  35.0 83 244  33.9 
SZ  342  370    1'739  21.3  29.3 533 1'228  43.4 
OW 60  75      273  27.5  43.1 56 200  27.8 
NW 76  90      381  23.6  46.4 81 263  30.9 
GL  111  119    636  18.7  29.2 110 405 27.3 
ZG  283  288    1'737  16.6  21.3 305 1'480  20.6 
FR  841  805    5'256  15.3  22.1 1'319 4'023 32.8 
SO  743  773    6'908  11.2  21.2 820 4'536  18.1 
BS  712  685    4'926  13.9  21.2 812 3'855  21.1 
BL  774  758    4'740  16.0  27.4 805 3'521  22.9 
SH  249  242    2'091  11.6  18.2 285 1'527  18.6 
AR  117  142    633  22.4  45.1 118 363 32.5 
AI 15  28     112  25.0  73.7 8  56  15.0 
SG 1'311 1'370     7'899  17.3  25.1 1'146 6'079 18.8 
GR  369  478    3'172  15.1  24.4 433 2'230  19.4 
AG 1'629 1'697     10'411  16.3  23.8 1'859 8'276 22.5 
TG  656  694    4'742  14.6  23.6 751 3'455  21.7 
TI 1'514  1'445      12'383  11.7  16.6 1'828 8'844 20.7 
VD 2'833 2'669     21'758  12.3  16.5 2'914  17'885  16.3 
VS 1'246 1'194     9'197  13.0  18.8 1'258 5'710 22.0 
NE  715  652    5'449  12.0  15.6 1'036 4'513 23.0 
GE 1'875 1'750     15'277  11.5  15.1 1'219  12'607 9.7 
JU  260  256    2'100  12.2  23.6 327 1'255  26.1 
Note:   Abbreviations of cantons: ZH: Zurich, BE: Bern, LU: Lucerne, UR: Uri, SZ: Schwyz, OW: Obwalden, NW: Nidwalden, GL: 
Glarus, ZG: Zug, FR: Fribourg, SO: Solothurn, BS: Basel-Town, BL: Basel-Country, SH: Schaffhausen, AR: Ap-
penzellOuter-Rhodes, AI: AppenzellInner-Rhodes, SG: StGall, GR: Grisons(Graubünden), AG: Argovia(Argau), TG: 
Thurgovia(Thurgau), TI: Ticino, VD: Vaud, VS: Valais(Wallis), NE: Neuchâtel, GE: Geneva, JU: Jura. 
a) The minimum quota is the minimum number of ‘year-places’ to be provided by the canton. A year-place corresponds to 
220 programme days.  
b) Minimum quota divided by the number of registered unemployed in January 1998 (and multiplied by 100). 
c) Minimum quota divided by the number of registered unemployed in December 1998 (and multiplied by 100). 
d) Realised places contain only courses, employment programmes and internships (Berufspraktika). Other smaller pro-
grammes are not included.  
e) Realised programme places in 1998 divided by the average number of unemployed in 1998 (and multiplied by 100). 
Source: Jonathan Gast, seco, Arbeitsmarktstatistik; own calculations. 
Columns seven to nine of Table 2.1 show that this measure of treatment intention indeed is correlated with 
subsequent treatment incidence during the year 1998. Column seven gives the number of year-places that 
actually were filled in the year 1998, while column eight displays the average number of unemployed in 
1998. Column nine shows the actual extent of treatment per unemployed as the ratio of the two previous 
numbers. The correlation between treatment intention (column 5) and actual treatment incidence (column 9) 8 
is 0.53, thus indicating that the quota indeed induced a higher treatment incidence in cantons with a high 
relative quota. 
Figure 2.1: The cantonal borders of Switzerland 
 
Note: http://www.kyte.de/mygeo/karten/switzerland/landkarte_schweiz.jpg. 
While the formula for the calculation of the minimum quota indeed generated a regional variation in treat-
ment intensity, the quota per unemployed is unlikely to be a valid instrument per se, as it is related to the 
unemployment rate in 1996. The quota per unemployed, however, might be a valid instrument locally if we 
restrict the analysis to confined areas along cantonal borders. This identification strategy is described in the 
next section. 9 
3  IV identification with regional variation in treatment intention intensity 
Regional variation in treatment intention intensity (i.e. the quota per unemployed) is a candidate instrumen-
tal variable for identifying the effects of actual treatment receipt. Since the minimum cantonal quotas are 
determined by federal law on the basis of the past labour market situation, they are not endogenously cho-
sen according to the preferences of local authorities. The extent to which labour market programmes are 
finally provided is subject to different regional perceptions in the cantonal administrations about the desir-
ability of ALMP and to the number of available unemployed. Nevertheless, a strong impact of the mini-
mum quota on the share of unemployed persons assigned to labour market programmes has been noted 
from Table 2.1. However, as argued above, regional variation per se cannot be used for identification as the 
necessary exclusion restriction is unlikely to be satisfied. In confined regions along the internal administra-
tive boundaries, however, the exclusion restriction should be valid. 
The identification is based on the concept of an economically integrated local labour market that is divided 
by an administrative border. A local labour market is considered as integrated if different job opportunities 
are valued irrespective of the location of residence. In other words, all relevant employment opportunities 
can be reached within convenient commuting distance (e.g. half an hour) from both sides of the border, 
such that the choice of workplace location and the choice of residence are not immediately tied. Switzer-
land, with its numerous administrative borders (Figure 2.1) and a very good commuting infrastructure, is a 
candidate country for finding such local labour markets. Nevertheless, the methods developed below apply 
more generally, because in many countries administrative borders often pass through densely populated 
areas. 
Within a local labour market, the different treatment intention intensities on the two sides of the border 
identify the effects of participation in ALMP on the subsequent labour market career. Two persons residing 
on opposite sides of the border live in the same economic environment, but when becoming unemployed 
they have to attend different regional employment offices. This will affect their probability of being as-
signed to ALMP. The REOs pursue different re-integration strategies, which are partly influenced by the 
minimum quota the canton has to fulfil. REOs in cantons with an ambitious quota per unemployed will 10 
assign earlier and more persons to programmes than cantons with a lower relative quota. This difference in 
the treatment probabilities identifies the treatment effect, which is a local average treatment effect (LATE) 
as defined by Imbens and Angrist (1994). This is further discussed in Section 3.1 for a single local labour 
market. Section 3.2 examines the situation with multiple local labour markets and introduces the aggregated 
local average treatment effect. Section 3.3 discusses estimation and the problem of weak instruments. 
While Section 3 discusses the approach and the assumptions in general, Section 4 describes the particular 
implementation for Switzerland. 
3.1  Local average treatment effect with two administrative regions 
Consider a population of unemployed living in a local labour market as defined above and being eligible to 
take part in active labour market programmes. Let Z denote the instrument quota per unemployed, and  i Z  
be the value of the instrument in the region where person i resides. Consider first a situation with only two 
administrative regimes, i.e. a single internal border. Hence,  {' ,' ' } ∈ i Z zz  can take only two different val-
ues. Suppose that  '' ' ≥ z z . In this setting, the IV approach simplifies to comparing those individuals living 
to the left of the border with those living to the right of the border, conditional on living close to the border. 
Individuals who live further apart from the border are outside the local labour market and are not included 
in the comparison because the IV assumptions are unlikely to be valid for them. Those living in the same 
local labour market have the same employment opportunities but are subjected to different risks of being 
assigned to labour market programmes when becoming unemployed. Let  i D  indicate whether an unem-
ployed participated in a programme ( i D =1) or not ( i D =0). Let  , iz D  denote the potential participation 
status if the level of the instrument were externally set to z. With the instrument taking only two different 
values, the potential participation variable  , iz D  defines four different types of individuals: The always-
participants, the never-participants, the compliers and the defiers. Let these different types be denoted by 
{,,,} Τ∈ i ancd . The always-participants would be assigned to a programme in both cantons. The never-
participants would in neither canton be assigned to a programme. The compliers are those who are assigned 11 
to ALMP in the canton with the higher quota per unemployed  '' z , but not in the canton with the lower 
quota  ' z . For the defiers, this pattern is reversed.  
Let  i Y  denote an outcome variable of interest (e.g. earnings, employment status) for an individual i and 
denote her potential outcomes by  ,
d




iz iz YY as the outcome 
that would be observed if z were fixed externally. The potential outcomes of interest are  , ≡
i
dd
ii Z YY  where 
d  is fixed externally without a change in Z. Since these potential outcomes might be confounded with the 
participation decision, the causal effect of labour market programmes cannot be inferred directly by simply 
comparing sample means. 
Under conditions discussed below, the treatment effect for the subpopulation of compliers is defined as: 
  [ ] [ ]
[] []




⎡⎤ −Τ = = ⎣⎦ =− =
E YZ z E YZ z
EY Y c
E DZ z EDZ z
. (1) 
This local average treatment effect (LATE, Imbens and Angrist, 1994) is the effect of the treatment on 
those individuals who would switch their treatment status if the value of their instrument would be changed 
exogenously. Hence, the compliers are those who would not participate in treatment if being subject to the 
labour market policy in the one canton, but participate if being subject to the labour market policy in the 
neighbouring canton. As the minimum quota is one of the causes of the different treatment incidence be-
tween the cantons, the compliers are the marginal group being induced to enter in treatment due to the dif-
fering quotas. Imbens (2001) gives conditions for the identification of a LATE by an instrumental variable. 
In our setting these general conditions translate to the following specific requirements:
9 
1) Regional treatment intention does not affect the non-treatment outcome:  
0 |Τ   ii i YZ  
                                                           
9 The following instrumental variables assumptions are exactly identical with the formulae in Imbens (2001), except 
for a lighter notation to improve readability and for a change from the letter T to D to be more in line with the rest 
of the literature. The original assumptions of Imbens (2001), with T replaced by D, are: Monotonicity: For all pairs 
(, ' ) z z  either  () (' ) ≥ ii D zD z  for all i or vice versa  () (' ) ≤ ii D zD z  for all i. Exclusion Restriction: 
{ } (, 0 ) ,(, 1 ) | ( )
∈   ii ii i i z Z YZ YZ Z Dz . Unconfounded Instrument: { } { } (, () ) , ()
∈∈   ii i i zZ zZ YzDz Dz Z . 12 
This exclusion restriction requires that the minimum quota does not directly affect the employment pros-
pects of an unemployed person in the case of nonparticipation. In other words, when not participating in 
ALMP), the employment chances should not depend on the location of residence. This assumption essen-
tially requires the labour market to be fully integrated across the border. Furthermore, any scale or spill 
over effects due to different treatment incidence on the two sides of the border must be arbitraged away.
10 
To take account of these requirements, in Section 4 we consider only local labour markets with very good 
commuting infrastructure and short commuting times. In particular, we require a commuting distance of at 
most 30 minutes by car. In addition, the unemployed person also has to be sufficiently mobile to take ad-
vantage of this commuting infrastructure to exploit employment opportunities within the entire local labour 
market. Therefore, we restrict our analysis to unemployed persons without (known or probable) restrictions 
to their mobility.  
2) Regional treatment intention does not affect the treatment outcome:    
1 |Τ   ii i YZ  
This assumption requires not only an integrated labour market, but assumes further that the treatment inten-
tion does not affect the quality and composition of ALMP. Essentially, it requires that the quality and com-
position of the offered programmes (in terms of their impact on employment chances) are the same in both 
regions. This assumption is more difficult to justify. It appears reasonable that the courses and programmes 
are of comparable quality on both sides of the border because often they are run by private providers that 
operate in the whole country.
11 However, the quota per unemployed might affect the composition of the 
labour market programmes. For example, if the quota is low, only one category of programmes might be 
offered, e.g. training. Once this category is full, an increasing quota induces the REOs to assign unem-
ployed also to other programmes. Such a systematic relationship would imply that the very definition of 
                                                           
10  A large number of unemployed persons participating in labour market programmes may affect the labour market 
situation of the non-participants. If the local labour market is integrated, these scale effects (or general equilibrium 
effects) affect the non-participants on both sides of the border similarly. 
11  Some cantons also purchase places from providers in the neighbouring cantons, e.g. Appenzell and StGall. 13 
treatment depends on the quota per unemployed. Such systematic patterns we could not find, though.
12 
However, also non-systematic variation in the composition of ALMP, e.g. due to the preferences of the 
REO management, could invalidate the above assumptions. Some REOs might prefer employment pro-
grammes, other rather prefer courses or temporary wage subsidies. Therefore we are going to compare only 
regions with a similar ALMP structure. 
3) Regional treatment intention is independent of employability of local population:     ,   iz i YZ  
Assumption 3 requires that the populations residing on the two sides of the border are identical in terms of 
their employability. A violation of this assumption could arise due to three channels. (A) Anticipation of the 
future employment prospects could have affected the instrument. In our application this is not possible be-
cause the value of the instrument is computed according to a pre-determined formula where forecasts of 
labour market developments did not enter. (B) Common factors might have affected the instrument and the 
outcome variables. Since the quota per unemployed is determined by the population share in 1996, the un-
employment share in 1996 and the number of unemployed in 1998, the average employability of the popu-
lation might have affected the instrument and be related to the employment outcomes measured in 1999, 
thereby introducing a correlation between the instrument and the potential outcomes.
13 Nevertheless, such a 
                                                           
12 Table C.3 gives the composition of the ALMP in the REOs in the local labour markets. It shows the allocation of the 
treated to training, employment programmes, temporaray wage subsidies and other programmes. When regressing 
the quota per unemployed of Table 2.1 on the average ALMP compositions in the cantons from Table C.3, all coef-
ficients are insignificant (except for the constant). A regression of the quota on the share in training yields a coeffi-
cient of 0.12 with a t-statistic of 1.3. A regression of the quota on the share in employment programmes gives -0.05 
(t-statistic 0.4), and a regression on the share in temporary wage subsidies gives -0.15 (1.1). When regressing on the 
training share and the employment programme share, the t-statistics are 1.4 and 0.8. Similarly, the t-statistics are 
0.8 and 0.5 when training share and temporary wages subsidy share are included as regressors, and 0.6 and 1.1 for 
employment programme share and temporary wages subsidy share. Only the rather tiny fraction of other pro-
grammes seems to be negatively related to the quota. 
13  For example, a low unemployment rate in 1996 and 1998 would have resulted in a rather high quota per unem-
ployed. If the good employment prospects continued into 1999, the instrument and the employment outcomes were 
positively correlated leading to upward biased estimates. However, other factors could have induced a negative cor-
relation, for example if the higher educated are more likely to migrate between cantons. Because the value of the 
instrument depends on the population and unemployment shares in 1996 divided by the number of unemployed in 14 
correlation is unlikely to be large, though, since the quota is based on average figures for the entire canton, 
whereas the IV estimator uses only the observations living close to the cantonal border. While differences 
in the industrial structures in other parts of the canton can induce differences in the value of the instrument, 
the composition of the population living close to the border is most likely to be very similar on both sides of 
the border. A potential factor that might have led to a sorting of the population in the vicinity of the border 
is local taxes, because income tax rates differ between cantons. However, income tax rates also differ be-
tween municipalities, which partly off-sets the differences between cantonal tax rates, as municipalities 
compete for high-earning residents. In addition, differences in tax rates are largely capitalised in the prices 
for housing and furthermore affect particularly people with high earnings, which represent only a tiny frac-
tion of the unemployed. 
(C) Finally, one could argue that the value of the instrument itself might have induced a sorting of the popu-
lation. Unemployed persons might have realised that the probability of being assigned to labour market 
programmes is different in the neighbouring canton. As some of them had preferences to take part in pro-
grammes, or conversely, to avoid them, they might have preferred attending a REO in the other canton. 
This, however, would have required moving to the neighbouring canton (before being assigned to a pro-
gramme). While the costs of changing residence are quite substantial, its benefits are small and highly un-
certain. First, the differences in the probability of being assigned to treatment are not very large between 
neighbouring cantons. Second, as the probability of treatment assignment also depends on the interaction 
between caseworker and the unemployed, a change in residence could have had unexpected consequences 
and might have made the unemployed person even worse off. Hence, a sorting of the population induced by 
the instrument appears unlikely.  
4) Regional treatment intention is independent of type-composition of local population:   Τ   ii Z  
                                                                                                                                                                                              
1998, different cantonal population growth rates could have generated a negative correlation. In-migration would 
have reduced the quota per unemployed, because of an increase in the number of unemployed persons in 1998. 
Analogously, out-migration would have increased the quota per unemployed. If the higher educated (which enjoy 
better employment prospects) are over-represented among the migrants, the instrument and the employment out-
comes would be negatively correlated. 15 
A further condition is that the value of the instrument should also be independent of the compliance type of 
the local population. Hence, the portions of always-participants, never-participants, defiers and compliers 
should be the same on both sides of the border. In particular, this rules out a selective choice of residence of 
the compliers, whose treatment status depends on the value of the instrument. As discussed above with 
assumption 3, such a selective choice of residence appears rather unlikely. 
5) The size of the defier population is zero:  ( ) 0 Τ == i Pd  
This monotonicity assumption requires that an increase in the quota per unemployed does not induce any 
unemployed person to switch from participation to non-participation. This assumption holds if an increase 
in the minimum quota would imply that more unemployed are assigned to treatment, but would not lead to 
any organisational changes. If increases in the quota are also associated with changes in the organisation, 
some unemployed persons who were assigned to treatment in the regime with the lower quota might no 
longer be assigned if an increased quota changes the patterns of people assigned to programmes. Although 
the latter cannot be ruled out, the portion of defiers is likely to be small and thus would not bias the results 
very much. Furthermore, if the treatment effect for the compliers and the defiers were identical, the bias 
would even be zero. 
6) The size of the complier population is positive:   ( ) 0 Τ => i Pc  
The final condition requires that the instrument indeed has an effect on the treatment probability. Table 2.1 
already confirmed this. Although this assumption is most innocuous and can even be tested, the size of the 
complier population does affect substantially the small sample properties of the estimator, as will be dis-
cussed below. 
Under these conditions, the effect of participation in ALMP for the compliers living in the local labour 
market along the administrative boundary is identified. It should be noted that with a single instrument at 
hand and without imposing further structure, only the effect of the active labour market programmes as a 16 
whole is identified, but not the effects of single programmes, e.g. of employment programmes or training 
courses.
14 
3.2 Aggregated  LATE 
The previous discussion referred to a simple setting with only two neighbouring regions. In many applica-
tions, however, there may be multiple administrative regions with multiple borders. The instrument then 
takes more than two different values, i.e.  { ,..., } i Z zz ∈ , where  ... ≤ ≤ z z . If all regions are located in the 
same local labour market and the above assumptions hold for a multivalued Z, the treatment effect on the 
subpopulation of all compliers is given by: 





zz E YZ z E YZ z
EY Y c
E DZ z EDZ z
=− =
⎡⎤ −Τ = = ⎣⎦ = −=
, (2) 
where 
, z z c  denotes the population changing treatment status when the value of the instrument changes 
from  z  to z . The treatment effect is identified from the observations in the canton with the highest quota 
per unemployed and the canton with the lowest quota. In principle, the observations from the cantons with 
intermediate values of Z are not needed. (This will be explained in more detail below.) 
This simple set-up changes, however, when the multiple regions contain various local labour markets with 
different economic conditions. As the instrument Z may be related to the economic conditions in the region, 
assumption 3 would be violated if all regions were examined together. This unconfoundedness assumption 
on Z may be valid only in confined areas along the border between two (or more) regions. Only in these 
areas along an internal border can a treatment effect be identified. Suppose there are l different local labour 
markets with an internal border, and for each a treatment effect is estimated. Examining the effects for the l 
different local labour markets separately can provide useful information on effect heterogeneity. More of-
ten, however, this examination of effect heterogeneity may lead to the conclusion that all estimates are in-
                                                           
14  One might have thought to isolate the effect of, for example, employment programmes by deleting all observations 
that participated in any other type of labour market programme. For identification, however, we also would need to 17 
significant and that the differences in the estimates largely reflect noise. To learn anything from the statisti-
cal analysis, the information contained in these l different estimates needs to be condensed through aggre-
gation or weighting to obtain some kind of summary measure. 
Let  ˆ θ  denote the column vector of the estimated treatment effects for the l local labour markets, and w a 
vector of weights that sum up to one. Define the aggregated local average treatment effect  ˆ Θ  as the 
weighted average of the single estimates: 
  ˆ ˆ '. Θ=w θ  (3) 
Since the treatment effects are estimated with different precision in the various local labour markets, we 
propose to choose weights either to minimise the variance of the aggregated effect, 




wV a r w s t w θ ι == , (4) 
or to minimise its mean squared error, 




wM S E w s t w θι  (5) 
where ι  is a column vector of ones.







































The aggregated LATE can be given two interpretations. If the complier treatment effects were identical in 
all the l local labour markets,  ˆ Θ  is the minimum-distance estimator of the common effect. If the treatment 
effects were heterogeneous, the aggregated LATE gives an approximate estimate of the effect associated 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
delete all observations that would participate in other types of programmes if the value of their instrument were 
changed. Since these persons are not identified, this is not possible. 
15  Similar considerations can be found in Heckman and Smith (2000) and Black, Smith, Berger and Noel (2003) on 
the aggregation of impact estimates from randomized experiments at multiple sites or at different times. 18 
with a change in the scale of the ALMP policy. Although the l different estimates refer to different sub-
populations, all these subpopulations have in common that they are at the margin of being assigned to a 
programme. If the scale of the policy were enlarged or reduced, e.g. through the use of quotas, these indi-
viduals are the first to be affected. One possibility would be to weight these l different estimates by the 
estimated size of the respective complier subpopulations. This would assign weights to the different com-
plier subpopulations in proportion to their share of the total subpopulation of all compliers. Weighting by 
the empirical complier sizes, however, led to a high variance in the Monte Carlo simulations in Appendix 
A. Another possibility would be to use theoretical weights that would emanate from specific policy scenar-
ios. E.g. if a uniform increase in the share of participants in ALMP in the whole country were aimed for, the 
necessary fraction of compliers would be the same in all cantons. This would suggest a uniform weighting 
of the l different estimates. Similarly, if a uniform share of participants were to be achieved, larger numbers 
of compliers would be needed in cantons with a low ALMP participation rate. An implicit assumption in 
these policy simulations is that the treatment effects for the ensuing complier subpopulations are similar to 
those for the compliers reacting to the minimum quota. These theoretical weights, however, might not be 
efficient from a statistical perspective because they completely neglect the variance of the estimates and 
may place disproportionate weight on a few very imprecise estimates. The proposed aggregated LATE with 
weights given by equation (6), on the other hand, is not bound to a specific policy scenario. Rather, it is 
based on statistical considerations to discern a main pattern from many noisy estimates.
16 
For computing the weights (6), an estimate of the variance or the MSE of  ˆ θ  is needed. If all local labour 
markets are defined as mutually exclusive, all covariance elements of  ˆ θ  are zero. However, local labour 
markets might also be defined as overlapping, and this could sometimes lead to more precise estimates in 
finite samples. Consider a local labour market that extends into three administrative regions: r, s and t. Let 
r z ,  s z  and  t z  denote the value of the instrument in the three respective regions and suppose that 
                                                           
16  One could imagine combining these two approaches, by choosing weights that approximately correspond to a spe-
cific policy scenario but also take the precision of the l different estimates into account. This is not attempted in this 
paper, though. 19 
<< rst z zz . Instead of considering this as a single local labour market, one could think of using the border 
between r and s, the border between s and t and the border between r and t separately as instruments. The 
respective complier treatment effects for these three borders are: 
|
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θ . (7) 
When passing the border from region r to region s, the size of the complier subpopulation is 
[| ] [| ] =− = s r E DZ z E DZ z . The size of the complier subpopulation associated with crossing the border 
from s to region t is  [| ] [| ] ts E DZ z E DZ z =− =. When passing from r to t, the complier subpopulation 
is the union of the two previous subpopulations. It can easily be seen that the treatment effect  | rt θ  is identi-
cal to a weighted average of  | rs θ , | s t θ  and also of  | rs θ , | rt θ , | s t θ , when the separate effects are weighted by the 
sizes of the corresponding complier subpopulation (see also Heckman and Vytlacil, 1999). 
Hence, the treatment effect for this local labour market can either be identified by  | rt θ  and neglecting the 
observations in region s. Alternatively, it can be obtained by estimating the pair-wise effects  | rs θ ,  | rt θ  and 
| st θ  and weighting them by the estimated complier fractions. Instead of weighting these pair-wise effects by 
the complier fractions, using the variance or MSE-minimising weights (6) could lead to more precise esti-
mates in finite samples. The Monte Carlo simulations in Appendix A show that this can indeed be the case. 
Estimation of the aggregated treatment effect proceeds in three steps. First,  ˆ θ  is estimated for all local la-
bour markets. Second, the covariance matrix of  ˆ θ  is estimated. Finally, the optimal weights are computed 
and  ˆ ˆ ˆ ' w θ Θ=  is calculated. The treatment effect for each of the local labour markets can be estimated con-
veniently by replacing means by averages in (1). Since for each local labour market the instrument is bi-20 
nary, this Wald estimator is equivalent to the linear IV or the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator. 
However, it is well known that IV estimators often perform poorly if the instrument is weak. Their finite 
sample distributions may be fat tailed and moments may exist only in the case of overidentification. This 
latter problem is of particular concern, as the very definition of the optimal weights (6) assumes the exis-
tence of the second moment. 
3.3  Weak instruments and aggregated LATE 
The literature on “weak instruments” has taken various directions to deal with these issues. One strand of 
the literature intends to improve inference for IV estimators in the presence of weak instruments.
17 A sec-
ond strand developed tests for weak instruments, e.g. Hahn and Hausman (2002) and Stock and Yogo 
(2002).
18 A third strand of the literature aimed at developing alternative estimators with better finite-sample 
properties in the case of weak instruments. Many of these are k-class estimators, introduced by Theil (1958) 
and Nagar (1959), and are of the type: 
  { [ ] } [ ]
1 '( 1) '( 1)
− −+ −+ NN NN NN N N D Ik k P D D Ik k P Y , (8) 
where N is the sample size,  N Y  is the data vector of the outcome variable,  N D  is the data matrix of the 
endogenous variables (including a constant),  N I  the identity matrix and 
'1 ' () NN N NN P ZZ Z Z
− =  the projec-
tion matrix of the data matrix of instruments  N Z  (including a constant). The constant k defines the specific 
estimator:  1 k =  gives the conventional 2SLS estimator.  0 k =  corresponds to OLS. Choosing k  as the 
smallest root of the determinantal equation  '' () 0 NN kIP Ξ Ξ− Ξ − Ξ = , where  [: ] NN YD Ξ=  is the hori-
                                                           
17  Alternative asymptotic theory (many-instrument asymptotics in Bekker, 1994, Hahn, 2002; weak-instrument asymp-
totics in Staiger and Stock, 1997, Wang and Zivot, 1998, Zivot, Startz and Nelson, 1998, Stock and Wright, 2000; 
and higher-order asymptotics as in Nagar, 1959, Anderson and Sawa, 1979, Morimune, 1983, Rothenberg, 1983, 
Hahn, Hausman and Kuersteiner, 2002, among others) has been developed, which leads to better coverage prob-
abilities in the presence of weak instruments. 
18  Donald and Newey (2001) are concerned with choosing the appropriate subset out of a set of valid instruments to 
minimise mean squared error. If many instruments are available, including all instruments in the IV estimator may 21 
zontal concatenation of  N Y  and  N D , gives the Limited Information Maximum Likelihood estimator 
(LIML). In the case of exact identification, LIML and 2SLS are identical. For normal errors (or errors with 
even fatter tails), LIML does not possess finite moments and 2SLS has moments only in the case of overi-
dentification.
19 Fuller (1977) proposed a modified LIML estimator with  /( ) = −− LIML kk NL α , where α  
is a positive constant and L  is the number of instruments. The Fuller estimator has first and second mo-
ments in finite-samples. Choosing  1 α =  gives nearly unbiased estimates, whereas  4 α =  yields asymp-
totically the smallest MSE, see also Rothenberg (1984). Angrist, Imbens and Krueger (1999), Blomquist 
and Dahlberg (1999), Donald and Newey (2001), and Hahn, Hausman and Kuersteiner (2002) proposed 
alternative estimators, which have superior theoretical properties compared to 2SLS and often perform well 
in finite-samples, see also Stock, Wright and Yogo (2002). 
The finite-sample behaviour of these estimators, however, has been analysed so far only under conditions 
very different from our setting. Often designs with a large number of overidentifying continuous instru-
ments were considered, whereas our instrument is binary. In addition, we estimate not only parameters but 
also the optimal weights for averaging these parameters. Since this set-up is rather different from conven-
tional instrumental variables estimation, we conducted a Monte Carlo study to analyse the properties of the 
aggregated treatment effect estimator in Appendix A. Although the limited Monte Carlo study does not 
allow for very strong conclusions, in total, the Fuller (1) estimator with variance-weighting performed best. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
worsen finite-sample properties when some of the instruments are weak. The data-driven procedure of Donald and 
Newey to select a subset of the available instruments can improve upon finite-sample properties. 
19  See Basmann (1961, 1963), Kabe (1964), Richardson (1968), Sawa (1969), Mariano and Sawa (1972), Nelson and 
Startz (1990), Buse (1992), Maddala and Jeong (1992) and others.  22 
4  Implementation of the evaluation of Swiss active labour market policies 
4.1  Data and sample selection 
The population for the microeconometric evaluation are all individuals who were unemployed on the first 
of January 1998, for at most one year.
20 For a random sample of 81'399 individuals, detailed information on 
employment histories (including self-employment), monthly earnings, participation in ALMP and personal 
characteristics for the years 1988 to 1999 were obtained from administrative databases of the unemploy-
ment insurance system and the social security records. The information includes age, gender, marital status, 
household composition, place of residence, nationality, type of work permit, mother tongue, foreign lan-
guages, education, qualification, caseworker’s assessment of employability, position in last job, occupation 
and industry of last job, size of town where worked before, looking for part-time or full-time job, occupa-
tion and industry of desired job, information on earnings in last job, duration of contribution to unemploy-
ment insurance, disability etc. For more details see Appendix B. 
Several sample selection criteria are applied to restrict the population to individuals who are eligible to take 
part in ALMP and for whom no restrictions to their mobility are known or probable, as discussed with our 
IV identification strategy in Section 3.1. In particular, disabled persons are excluded, as well as foreigners 
with a working permit of less than a year, since there are legal restrictions to their mobility. In addition, 
persons with a very low income (monthly earnings in last job below 1000 CHF, ≈650 EURO) are left out, 
because monetary costs of commuting might be an obstacle to them to take advantage of job opportunities 
that are not nearby. We also restrict the sample to the prime age group (25-55). Furthermore, we excluded 
students, apprentices and homeworkers and persons who are registered as part-time employed. The losses 
of observations due to these sample selection rules are detailed in Table B.1 in the appendix. The final sam-
ple contains 66'713 observations. 
                                                           
20 Persons who were unemployed for more than a year are excluded because they entered in unemployment before the 
reform was enforced in January 1997 and were thus subject to different rules and regulations at the entry in unem-
ployment. In addition, their entitlement period to ALMP expired before the end of 1998. 23 
4.2 Variables   
Since with a binary instrumental variable we can identify only the effect of a binary treatment, as discussed 
in Section 3, we partition the population into two groups. Treatment is defined as entering in an active la-
bour market programme of at least one week duration at any time in 1998. These programmes vary in qual-
ity and content but can broadly be distinguished into 4 categories: training, employment programmes, tem-
porary wage subsidies, and other programmes. 
Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics of selected characteristics (Means or shares) 
Variable name  Treated  Non-treated 
Age  38.2  37.3 
Female  45  41 
Swiss nationality  56  55 
Insured earnings (Swiss Francs, CHF) a  3'980  3'832 
     
Treatment status in 1998 (first programme)     
Participated in training  34  - 
Participated in employment programme  22  - 
Participated in temporary wage subsidy  42  - 
Participated in other labour market programmes  1  - 
      
Outcome variables in 1999    
Employed    average  for  January-April  1999  45  53 
     average  for  May-August  1999  59  63 
     average  for  September-December  1999 66  64 
High earnings (> 90% of insured earnings)   average for January-April 1999  27  35 
     average  for  May-August  1999  35  42 
     average  for  September-December  1999 37  42 
Labour earnings (from wage and    average for January-April 1999  1'714  2'091 
   self-employment) in CHF     average for May-August 1999  2'218  2'455 
     average  for  September-December  1999 2'408  2'470 
Observations 40'193  26'520 
Note:   66'713 observations. a) 1 Swiss Franc (CHF) ≈ 2/3 Euro. 
Overall, 60% of all unemployed entered active labour market programmes (with the average month of entry 
being March 1998). Table 4.1 shows that 34% of the treated received training, 22% participated in an em-
ployment programme, 42% became employed in a temporary wage subsidy, and the remaining 1% partici-
pated in other labour market programmes.
21 
                                                           
21  The numbers refer to the first programme the unemployed participated in. There are some unemployed participating 
in more than one programme, however most subsequent programmes are of the same type as the first programme. 24 
To uncover the dynamics of the programme effects, we follow the individual labour market situation over 
the year 1999 and create the following outcome variables: A person is defined as being employed if positive 
earnings are reported for at least three consecutive months. By this definition we intend to measure con-
tinuous employment of at least one month duration.
22 A person is being considered as employed with high 
earnings if she earns at least 90% of what she earned on her last job.
 23  In addition, monthly earnings itself 
is considered as a further outcome variable. These three outcome variables are created for every person and 
every month in 1999. To reduce noise, 4-month averages are taken. The last panel in Table 4.1 shows their 
sample means. These outcome variables capture the different policy objectives of the active labour market 
policies, which are rapid and lasting re-employment without large earnings losses. 
4.3  Identifying local labour markets 
To apply the evaluation strategy discussed in the previous sections, integrated local labour markets with 
internal administrative borders need to be found. We define a local labour market in terms of the area corre-
sponding to one or more regional employment offices. In particular, we seek to identify a cluster of REOs 
that satisfies the following criteria: 1) The REOs belonging to the cluster are spread over 2 cantons; 2) 
commuting times by car between these REOs are 30 minutes or shorter; 3) the same language (French, 
German or Italian) is spoken in the areas belonging to the REOs; 4) The ALMP composition is similar in 
the REOs. With the first criterion, we identify local labour markets pair-wise between cantons. As dis-
cussed in Section 3.2, if a local labour market extends into three or more cantons, we consider each pair-
wise comparison between the cantons separately.  
The second criterion ensures that all potential employers can be reached within convenient commuting dis-
tance from both sides of the cantonal border. This criterion is implemented by examining the distances be-
                                                           
22  If positive earnings are reported in only two consecutive months, this could, for example, be the result of an em-
ployment spell that lasted only one week and began close to the end of the first month. By requiring three consecu-
tive months, such very short spells can largely be excluded. However, some short employment spells might still be 
included if they appear repeatedly within this three months window. 25 
tween any pair of regional employment offices in terms of commuting times by car. (See Table B.3 for a 
list of REOs. The commuting times are shown in Table C.1. A maximum driving time of about 30 minutes 
appears to be acceptable for exploiting wage arbitrage opportunities.
24 Switzerland is one of the countries 
with the highest per capita car ownership world-wide. In addition, public transportation is also very good in 
Switzerland and reaches every village. 
The third criterion takes account of the different language regions, as Switzerland consists of German, 
French and Italian speaking parts. Local labour markets where French is spoken on the one side of the bor-
der and German on the other side are excluded. French-German bilingual regions bordering to German 
speaking regions are not excluded, though. In such local labour markets, all observations with French 
mother tongue are deleted, as they may not consider the neighbouring German speaking region as part of 
their labour market where to search for jobs. According to the criteria one to three, 30 local labour markets 
are identified (and shown in Table C.2). 
As discussed in Section 3, one of the IV assumptions is that the quality and type of treatment is identical on 
both sides of the cantonal border. It appears reasonable to assume that the quality of the services does not 
vary systematically between neighbouring regions, because many of the providers of training courses and 
employment programmes operate in the whole country. However, there seems to be variation in the types of 
programmes the caseworkers assign their clients to, which may be due to different philosophies of the 
REOs. Criterion 4 therefore requires that the allocation of the treated to the different ALMP categories is 
similar on both sides of the border. By defining similarity in terms of maximum divergence between the 
allocations, we distinguish between local labour markets with a very similar ALMP-structure (Selection A), 
labour markets with a comparable structure (Selection B, including Selection A), and labour markets with a 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
23  The social security records data report earnings for every month. Unlike in the U.S., the social security earnings 
data are not top-coded. In addition, every regularly employed person has to contribute, including government work-
ers and self-employed. 
24  In Switzerland about 50% of the working population commute less than 15 minutes, about 80% commute 30 min-
utes or less (one way; Bundesamt für Statistik, 2003). 26 
distinct ALMP structure. The implementation of this similarity criterion is described in Appendix C, and 
the Tables C.2 and C.3 give details on all 30 local labour markets. 
Table 4.2 displays summary statistics only for the local labour markets with at least a comparable ALMP-
structure (Selection B), because only these local labour markets are used for the estimation of the aggre-
gated LATE. The last column indicates whether the labour market is classified as having a very similar 
ALMP-structure (Selection A). Column one, gives the number of the local labour market, as used in Table 
C.2. Column two indicates the cantonal border that functions as the instrument, and columns three and four 
give the REOs belonging to this local labour market (on the two sides of the border). For example, the row 
corresponding to labour market 7 indicates that the areas corresponding to the REOs of Langenthal and 
Zofingen are considered as a local labour market, with Langenthal belonging to the canton Bern (BE) and 
Zofingen belonging to the canton Aargau (AG). Columns five and six give the number of observations in 
the sample, 313 in Langenthal and 472 in Zofingen. Columns seven and eight display how many of these 
observations were treated, and column nine gives the difference in the treatment probability. This is an es-
timate of the fraction of compliers and lies in the range of ±15 percentage points, with many small values. 27 
Table 4.2: Local labour markets divided by administrative border  
 
#  Can-
tons  Regional employment offices 
Number of ob-
servations 
n1                n2 






(1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7) (8) (9)  (10) (11) 
2 SO-BE Solothurn, Oensingen, 
Biberist, Zuchwil 
Wangen, Langenthal, 
Burgdorf  877 818 68 63 5.6  -3.9  x 
7  BE-AG  Langenthal  Zofingen  313 472 64 68  -4.9  -1.2   
8 BE-FR Gümligen, Zollikofen, 
Köniz, Bern (2x)  Murten, Tafers, Fribourg  2'660a 763a 65 67 -1.7  -0.2  x 
9  FR-VD  ChatelSt.Denis  Oron  la  Ville  107 107 74 59  15.0  3.0  x 
10  FR-VD  Romont,  Estavayer  Payerne,  Moudon  371 355 64 60 3.3  3.0   
11 VD-GE  Nyon  Genf  (6x)  576  5'700  57  50  6.5  0.8  x 
12  VD-VS  Vevey, Aigle, Montreux  Monthey (2x)  1'580  609  59  66  -6.7  -0.7   
13 BL-BS  Pratteln, München-




menbrücke, Kriens  Hergiswil  (2x)  1'607  265 64 62 2.4  -10.4   
16 LU-ZG  Luzern, Emmen, Em-
menbrücke, Kriens  Zug  1'607  571 64 64  -0.2  -1.5   
17  SZ-UR  Goldau  Altdorf  337 150 69 61 8.8  -1.3   
19 AG-ZH  Baden, Wettingen, 
Wohlen 
Opfikon, Effretikon, 
Uster, Wetzikon, Bülach, 
Dietikon, Regensdorf     
1'529 4'165  64  58  6.6  3.5   
21  ZH-TG  Winterthur  Frauenfeld    1'221  537 59 69  -9.9  -1.8  x 
22  ZH-SG  Meilen,  Thalwil  Rapperswil  1'421  360 56 60  -3.8  -4.5  x 
23  ZH-SZ  Meilen,  Thalwil  Lachen  1'421  529 56 72  -15.2  -8.5  x 
24  TG-SH  Frauenfeld    Schaffhausen  537 605 69 63 6.3  3.1   
25  TG-SG  Amriswil  Rohrschach,  Oberuzwil  474 853 64 66  -1.5  -2.7  x 
28  SG-SZ  Rapperswil  Lachen  360 529 60 72  -11.4  -3.9   
Note:  a Number of observations after deleting individuals with French mother-tongue, because a French-German bilingual 
region is bordering a German speaking region. 
b The estimate of the fraction of compliers is the difference between the previous two columns. 
c Difference in the instrument quota per unemployed (Table 2.1, column 5) between the two cantons. 
Before estimating any treatment effects, it is interesting to compare the variation in actual treatment, as 
estimated with this micro data set, with the variation in the instrument quota per unemployed, as discussed 
in Section 2. Column ten of Table 4.2 gives the difference in the quota per unemployed between the two 
cantons (calculated from column 5 of Table 2.1). Column nine shows the estimated fraction of compliers, 
i.e. the fraction of unemployed who are induced to treatment when being subjected to the quota of the other 
canton. This is the effect of the instrument Z on the probability of treatment. Although not strictly necessary 
for identification, since identification in this paper is only based on pair-wise comparisons, a positive rela-
tionship between differences in the instrument Z and differences in the treatment probability is expected. 
Figure 4.1 shows that this relationship is indeed positive (on the left for Selection A, on the right for Selec-28 
tion B). The correlation is 0.78 for Selection A and 0.57 for Selection B. In all labour markets, the change 
in Z and its estimated effect on treatment participation D have the same sign, except for the three labour 
markets 2, 15 and 17. The opposing signs in these latter markets may be the result of sampling variability. 
On the other hand, it might also indicate a failure of the monotonicity condition in these three markets. To 
be on the safe side, these three local labour markets are excluded in the subsequent estimations. (The results 
are similar when including them.) 
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Note:   Abscissa: Differences in the quota per unemployed (column 10 of Table 4.2); ordinate: differences in treatment probability 
(complier fraction, column 9 of Table 4.2); for labour markets of Selection A (left figure) and of Selection B (right figure). 
5 Results 
5.1  Local average treatment effects in the local labour markets 
In the following the estimation results are presented. Table 5.1 shows the Fuller estimates  ˆ θ  of the local 
average treatment effects for all 30 labour markets. The corresponding Wald estimates are given in the ap-
pendix in Table D.1. The effects of being treated in 1998 on the employment and earnings outcomes in 
1999 are given, separately for the months May to August 1999 and September to December 1999. The es-
timation results are highly volatile and sometimes even change sign between the different outcome vari-
ables. Some of the estimates are even outside the logical range, e.g. a reduction in employment probability 
of more than 100 percentage points. This volatility may indicate a substantial heterogeneity in the treatment 
effects. More plausible, though, it is the result of substantial noise in the estimates, reflecting the weakness 
of the instrument Z and the often small number of observations. 29 
Table 5.1: Fuller estimates of the local average treatment effects for the 30 local labour markets 
    LATE estimated with Fuller (1), year 1999 
 Region  Employment  a (in%-points)  High earningsb (in%-points)  Labour earnings in CHFc 
   May-Aug.  Sept.-Dec.  May-Aug.  Sept.-Dec.  May-Aug.  Sept.-Dec. 
1  SO-BE  1  -12 -25 -35 740 110 
2  SO-BE  -143  -97 -67 -43  -4'650  -2'800 
3 SO-BL  12  25  -3  -9  -460  -260 
4  SO-AG  -5  -37 -12 -28  -2'320  -3'970 
5  NE-BE  41 55 58 74  1'610  790 
6 NE-BE  0  -1  7  13  410  -370 
7 BE-AG  -176  -127  -44  -29  -3'430  -2'290 
8 BE-FR  -110  -63  1  27  -2'550  -1'390 
9  FR-VD  79 38 56 40  3'020  1'720 
10  FR-VD  22 54 51 62  3'320  4'760 
11 VD-GE  97  147  56  79  7'560  9'110 
12  VD-VS  78 77 47 34  1'220  950 
13 BL-BS  -5  5  21  10  1'620  1'670 
14  LU-AG  -121 -90 -104 -96  -5'260  -4'840 
15  LU-NWOW  -126  -149 -74 -114  -7'390  -9'240 
16  LU-ZG  -17  -8 -9 -3  350  600 
17 SZ-UR  -17  -62  13  -3  -1'270  -3'720 
18  SZ-ZG  6  -25 -17 -48  -6'250  -7'550 
19  AG-ZH  16 16 54 67  -250  -100 
20  ZH-SH  -32 -58 -21 -41  -4'820  -5'750 
21 ZH-TG  35  16  2  -10  190  -440 
22  ZH-SG  3 -65 0 -48  -4'810  -6'880 
23 ZH-SZ  16  9  1  -2  -660  -990 
24  TG-SH  54 66 12 28  2'190  2'200 
25  TG-SG  -5 -24 -8 -41  1'280  -160 
26 SG-AR  14  -3  16  26  3'120  4'180 
27  AR-AI  -7 -11 -8 -16  -810  -1'110 
28 SG-SZ  18  44  0  20  1'490  2'130 
29  SG-GR  -74 -88 -40 -21  -4'460  -3'200 
30 GR-TI  -104  -9  -68  -10  -4'680  -1'430 
Note:   a Employment: A person is employed if positive earnings are reported for at least 3 consecutive months.  
b High earnings: A person is being considered as employed with high earnings if reported earnings are larger than 90% of 
the insured earnings.  
c Earnings: From wage and self-employment (excluding benefits). 1 CHF ≈ 2/3 Euro. 
5.2 Aggregated  LATE 
To learn anything from these noisy estimates, their statistical information is condensed to an average effect 
of ALMP for compliers. The estimated effects of Table 5.1 are aggregated, using variance weighting as 
suggested by the Monte Carlo study in Appendix A. The weights are 
11 ˆˆ /( ' ) w ι ιι
−− =Σ Σ  where  ˆ ˆ () Σ=Var θ  
is the estimated covariance matrix of  ˆ θ . Table 5.2 shows the aggregated treatment effect  ˆ ˆ ' w θ Θ=  for the 
15 local labour markets with comparable ALMP-structure (Selection B, without labour markets 2, 15, 17). 30 
The first rows in Table 5.2 give the estimated weights, which were estimated separately for each outcome 
variable. The local labour market 13 receives about 30% of the weights, while the remaining weights are 
spread relatively even among the other labour markets. The following three rows show the estimated aggre-
gate effect  ˆ ˆ ' w θ Θ= , the estimated standard error  ˆ ' ww Σ , and the t-value  ˆ ˆ '/ ' ww w θ Σ . The covari-
ance matrix  ˆ Σ  is estimated through 10'000 bootstrap replications. 
For testing whether  ˆ Θ  is statistically different from zero, two approaches are pursued. In the first approach, 
the estimated weights  ˆ w are treated as non-stochastic and the distribution of the aggregated effect  ˆ Θ  is 
simulated through 10'000 bootstrap replications. The quantiles of the bootstrap distribution (centred by 
subtracting the estimate  ˆ Θ ) are shown in the rows labelled 'Bootstrap of estimate with fixed weights'. The 
largest quantile that is surpassed by the estimate  ˆ Θ  is underlined. 
In the second approach, the weights  ˆ w are themselves treated as stochastic in the simulation of the distribu-
tion of the aggregated effect  ˆ Θ . This, however, requires a double bootstrapping approach. First, a bootstrap 
sample is drawn and  ˆ
b θ  is estimated from this bootstrap sample. The estimation of the weights  ˆb w  for this 
bootstrap sample requires an estimate of the covariance matrix of  ˆ
b θ . This covariance matrix 
ˆ ˆ () Σ= bb Var θ  is estimated by bootstrapping from the bootstrap sample. Only 1'000 replications are used to 
estimate  ˆ Σb , since the whole process is computationally demanding. With  ˆ Σb  estimated, the weights are 
calculated as 
11 ˆˆ ˆ /( ' )
−− =Σ Σ bb b w ι ιι  and the bootstrap estimate  ˆ ˆ ˆ ' Θ= bb b w θ  is computed. This process is 
repeated 1'000 times. The quantiles of the distribution of  ˆ Θb (centred by subtracting  ˆ Θ ) are shown in the 
rows labelled 'Bootstrap of estimate with stochastic weights'. As an alternative to bootstrapping  ˆ Θ , the 
results for bootstrapping the t-values are also shown.
 25 
                                                           
25  If the estimated aggregated effect is asymptotically normal, the t-statistic is asymptotically pivotal and a test based 
on bootstrapping the t-statistic has better properties. Deriving conditions under which this is the case is beyond the 
scope of this paper. Notice, however, that if the weights are treated as stochastic, the statistic  ˆ ˆ ˆˆ ˆ '/ ' ww w θ Σ , which 31 
Table 5.2: Aggregated treatment effect for compliers, Selection B 
  Outcome variables, year 1999 
  Employment (in%-points)  High earnings (in%-points)  Labour earnings in CHF 
weights (%)  May-Aug.  Sept.-Dec.  May-Aug. Sept.-Dec. May-Aug. Sept.-Dec. 
BE-AG  1 1 3 4 3 3 
BE-FR  1 2 3 3 3 3 
FR-VD    3 4 4 4 5 5 
FR-VD  3 2 2 2 2 1 
VD-GE  4 3 5 4 2 2 
VD-VS  4 5 5 5 8 9 
BL-BS  34 35 30 32 32 31 
LU-ZG  1 2 3 3 1 1 
AG-ZH    11 12  8  8  12 11 
ZH-TG  7 9 8 9 9 9 
ZH-SG  7 2 7 3 2 1 
ZH-SZ  11 19 10 16 16 16 
TG-SH  1 0 1 1 1 1 
TG-SG  3 3 3 2 3 4 
SG-SZ  9 3 9 4 4 3 
Estimate of mean  14.3  13.7  16.8  13.4  702  541 
Std.error 7.3  7.2  7.3  7.6  401  396 
t-value  1.95 1.90 2.30 1.78 1.75 1.36 
Bootstrap of estimate with fixed weights 
Q0.95 13.2 13.7 12.4 13.3 712 716 
Q0.975 15.4  16.2  14.8 16.1 855  853 
Q0.995  20.2 20.5 20.0 20.6 1'158  1'138 
        
Bootstrap of estimate with stochastic weights 
Q0.95 8.5  9.3  8.2  9.0  422  524 
Q0.975  11.4 11.0 10.0 11.1 546 650 
Q0.995 13.4 13.3 13.9 14.7 694 813 
Bootstrap of t-value with fixed weights 
Q0.95  1.56 1.67 1.44 1.50 1.49 1.50 
Q0.975 1.78 1.90 1.63 1.72 1.71 1.71 
Q0.995 2.26  2.46  2.11 2.17 2.25 2.12 
Bootstrap of t-value with stochastic weights 
Q0.95  1.17 1.30 1.06 1.23 1.10 1.34 
Q0.975  1.51 1.55 1.34 1.43 1.35 1.61 
Q0.995 1.80 1.82 1.75 1.92 1.67 1.96 
Note:   Estimation of stderror based on 10'000 bootstrap replications. Quantiles of estimate with fixed weights based on 10'000 
replications. The other quantiles are estimated by double bootstrapping and only based on 1'000 replications in inner 
bootstrap and 1'000 replications in outer bootstrap. Aggregated LATE for labour markets 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 19, 
21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 28. 
The estimation results indicate a positive effect of participation in ALMP on employment and high earnings 
employment of about 15 percentage-points. With the weights treated as stochastic, all estimates are signifi-
                                                                                                                                                                                              
is referred to as the t-value in Table 5.2, is not the usual t-statistic because the denominator  ˆ ˆˆ ' ww Σ  is not a consis-
tent estimator of the standard-deviation of  ˆ ˆ ' w θ . Therefore, it might be non-pivotal even if the estimated aggregated 
effect were asymptotically normal. Bootstrapping the t-value requires double bootstrapping, even when the weights 
are treated as fixed. 32 
cant at the 1% or 5% level, except for the last one, which is significant only at the 10% level. The estimated 
earnings effect is about 600 CHF. With average previous earnings of about 4'000 CHF (Table 4.1), this is 
the expected magnitude if the additional 15 percent employed were earning their average previous wage. 
The estimation results for Selection A (see Table D.2) are largely similar but with smaller and insignificant 
earnings effects, which may be due to the smaller number of observations included. 
5.3  Aggregated treatment effects for urban labour markets 
The previous analysis indicated positive effects of labour market programmes on employment prospects. 
These results, however, might be difficult to interpret as they refer to a heterogeneous population in differ-
ent types of labour markets. To analyse the effects for a more homogeneous population, Table 5.3 gives 
results for urban labour markets only.  
Table 5.3: Aggregated treatment effect for large-city regions 
  Outcome variables, year 1999 
  Employment (in %-points)  High earnings (in %-points)  Labour earnings in CHF 
  May-Aug. Sept.-Dec. May-Aug. Sept.-Dec. May-Aug. Sept.-Dec. 
weights  (%)        
BE-FR  1 2 4 4 3 4 
VD-GE  5 3 6 5 2 2 
BL-BS 42 41 38 41 41 40 
AG-ZH 14 14 11 10 15 15 
ZH-TG 10 11 12 12 13 13 
ZH-SG  2 1 3 2 1 1 
ZH-SZ 27 28 26 27 25 25 
Estimate of mean  11.2  10.7  17.8  13.5  525  429 
Std.error 8.1  7.9  8.3  8.5  458  459 
t-value  1.38 1.36 2.15 1.58 1.15 0.94 
Bootstrap of estimate with fixed weights 
Q0.95  14.6 14.4 14.1 14.2 829  809 
Q0.975 17.4  16.9  17.2 17.2 973  958 
Q0.995  22.5 22.1 22.6 23.0 1'298  1'253 
Bootstrap of estimate with stochastic weights 
Q0.95 11.4  11.2  9.8  10.4  573  596 
Q0.975  13.9 13.0 11.6 12.8 716 684 
Q0.995 17.6  17.2  16.3 15.4 929  945 
Bootstrap of t-value with fixed weights 
Q0.95  1.53 1.57 1.46 1.46 1.56 1.50 
Q0.975  1.78 1.91 1.67 1.64 1.78 1.75 
Q0.995 2.41  2.44  2.12 2.02 2.34 2.16 
Bootstrap of t-value with stochastic weights 
Q0.95  1.38 1.41 1.13 1.17 1.29 1.30 
Q0.975  1.70 1.66 1.33 1.42 1.54 1.49 
Q0.995 2.11  2.16  1.83 1.85 2.00 1.96 
Note: See note below Table 5.2. Aggregated LATE for labour markets 8, 11, 13, 19, 21, 22, 23. 33 
As urban labour markets are considered the region between Bern and Fribourg (labour market 8), the region 
around Geneva (labour market 11), the region around Basle (13), the region around Zurich (19), the region 
around Winterthur (21) and the south-eastern shores of lake Zurich (22 and 23). See Table C.4 for details. 
The estimates for these urban regions are slightly smaller but almost the same as in Table 5.2, albeit less 
significant. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper, a new approach to exploiting regional administrative borders locally as an instrumental vari-
able to evaluate the effects of policy interventions has been suggested and applied to the evaluation of 
Swiss active labour market policies. The methodological contributions are twofold. First, the choice of an 
appropriate estimator for estimating treatment effects with a binary instrument has been examined. It was 
found that the Wald estimator, which is used in almost all applications with a binary instrument, performs 
poorly when the instrument is weak. The Fuller (1977) estimator turned out to be most reliable in finite 
samples. Second, with many different regional borders, separate effects can be estimated for each of these. 
However, most of them may be insignificant due to the small number of observations in the local areas 
neighbouring the border. To uncover any significant pattern from these noisy estimates, a weighting scheme 
for the aggregation of these estimates into a single, specific local average treatment effect has been pro-
posed. The Fuller estimator again seemed to be particularly suited for the estimation of the aggregated 
treatment effect, because its finite-sample moments exist. 
For evaluating the Swiss active labour market policies, the geographical variation in treatment intensity, 
induced by the 1997 reform of the unemployment insurance system, has been exploited to estimate the ef-
fects of participating in labour market programmes on subsequent employment and earnings prospects. 
Fairly large positive and significant aggregate effects on individual employment probabilities of about 15 
percentage-points were found. In addition, no earnings losses were observed, indicating that the higher 
employment probability was not the result of pushing unemployed into low-paying jobs.  34 
On a first sight, these positive employment effects appear to be at odds with the often negative or insignifi-
cant effects found in the literature, e.g. in Gerfin and Lechner (2002), Gerfin, Lechner and Steiger (2002), 
or Lalive, van Ours and Zweimüller (2000). One difference to these other studies is the aggregation of the 
active labour market programmes. Whereas many of the other studies distinguish the effects for different 
types of programmes, in this paper all labour market programmes are aggregated into one group, because 
disaggregated effects by programme type are not identified with this instrumental variable strategy. Positive 
treatment effects indeed have also been detected in the other studies for certain programme types. Gerfin 
and Lechner (2002) and Gerfin, Lechner and Steiger (2002), for example, found large and significant posi-
tive effects for the temporary wage subsidies. In the urban local labour markets considered in this paper, 
temporary wage subsidies represent about 40-50% of the active labour market programmes, while employ-
ment programmes account only for about 20-25%. 
A second difference is the geographical focus. Whereas the other studies examine average effects for the 
entire country, in this paper we have to restrict our focus on the individuals living close to a cantonal bor-
der. A third difference is that our estimates refer to a (weighted) treatment effect on the compliers, whereas 
most other studies concentrate on population average treatment effects or effects on the treated. The sub-
population of compliers consists of those unemployed that were assigned to active labour market pro-
grammes because of differences in the (indirect) incentives to caseworkers to fill the minimum quota. A 
simple argument would postulate that the treatment effect for this marginal group should be smaller than 
the treatment effect on the treated if utility maximising individuals decide about participation or if case-
workers act on their behalf. In the case of Switzerland, this need not be the case. With the activation princi-
ple introduced by the reform, it is the caseworker who can push an unemployed person into a labour market 
programme. Lechner and Smith (2003) analysed this assignment process and found that caseworkers were 
not very successful in assigning unemployed to their most beneficial programmes. Overall, they found that 
a random allocation presumably would not have been worse. The marginal group of compliers might there-
fore have benefited more from labour market programmes than others (at least in the short term as meas-
ured in this paper, when the economy was booming), and the local average treatment effect thus could have 35 
been higher than the treatment effect on the treated. Summarising this discussion succinctly, the Swiss ac-
tive labour market programmes seem to have been effective for at least a part of the population, while they 
may not have been so for the population as a whole. This individual treatment effect heterogeneity may 
support the need for a better targeting of active labour market programmes. 
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Appendix A: Weak instruments estimators and Monte Carlo simulation 
In the following Monte Carlo simulation, the finite sample properties of various estimators proposed to deal 
with the problem of weak instruments are compared for the specific situation in this paper: a binary en-
dogenous regressor and an instrumental variable taking only two different values (within each local labour 
market). The Monte Carlo is designed to capture some features of the possible effects of ALMP on earn-
ings, in particular, heterogeneous incomes and heterogeneous treatment effects.
26 
As a versatile but simple design for the Monte Carlo we consider a single local labour market that belongs 
to 3 different administrative regions: r, s and t. This allows us to consider a single treatment effect  r|t θ  be-
tween region r and t and three pair-wise effects  r|s r|t s|t ,, θ θθ  in the same scenario. As explained in Section 
3.2,  r|t θ  is the effect on all compliers and is identical to a compliers-weighted average of  r|s r|t s|t ,, θθθ . In 
the Monte Carlo simulations, different estimators of  r|t ˆ θ  and of the aggregated LATE are examined. This 
serves two purposes. First, to examine the finite sample properties of the aggregated LATE in different 
scenarios and for different sample sizes.
27 Second, by comparing the properties of  r|t ˆ θ  with the aggregated 
LATE (of the pair-wise effects  ||| ˆˆˆ ,, rs rt st θ θθ ), the benefits from splitting a single local labour market that 
stretches into more than two administrative regions into multiple pair-wise comparisons can be assessed (as 
discussed in Section 3.2).
28 
                                                           
26 Since the Monte Carlo simulations are computationally expensive (due to the bootstrapping), only a continuous 
outcome variable is examined here. We expect the results to be qualitatively similar for a binary outcome variable. 
27 Since in this particular set-up the three pair-wise effects  ||| ˆˆˆ ,, rs rt st θ θθ  are correlated, the estimation of the weights 
for the aggregated LATE estimator is more difficult as variances and covariances need to be estimated. If all local 
labour markets were defined as mutually exclusive, all off-diagonal elements of the covariance matrix of  ˆ θ  were 
known to be zero, yielding less noisy estimates of the optimal weights. The Monte Carlo results can therefore be in-
terpreted as demonstrating the behaviour of the aggregated LATE in a rather difficult scenario. 
28 In principle,  r|t ˆ θ  is a consistent estimator of the treatment effect on the total complier subpopulation, because the 
impact of the region on the treatment probability is monotonic and the regions r and t are the regions with the low-40 
The population is spread asymmetrically across these three regions, such that 5% of the population live in 
region r ( = ir Z z ), 65% in region s and 30% in region t. The region of residence affects monotonically the 
probability of being assigned to treatment  i D  but does not affect the potential earnings outcomes 
0
i Y  and 
1
i Y . The treatment status is given by 
  ()( ) () 10 . 2 1 0 . 3 1 0 =−⋅ = +⋅ =+> ii r i t i DZ z Z z u  (0.9) 
and the observed outcome is given by 
  (1 ) ii i i YD αβ =+ +  (0.10) 
where 
  () ,, ( 0 ,) Ω ∼ ii i ui i d N αβ . (0.11) 
i α  are the earnings when not participating in ALMP,  1 i β +  is the treatment effect. Both are heterogeneous 
over the individuals. Through the choice of the covariance matrix Ω different average treatment effects, 
treatment effects on the treated and on the non-treated and different local average treatment effects can be 
generated. The region of residence shifts the probability of being assigned to treatment, but does not affect 
the potential outcomes. Observations with  (0,0.2] i u ∈  would not participate when living in region r, but 
would participate in treatment when living in region s. Similarly, observations with  (0 . 3 , 0 ] i u ∈−  would 
change their treatment status if transferred from region s to region t. Hence, the total complier subpopula-
tion is all observations with  (0 . 3 , 0 . 2 ] i u ∈− , because observations with  0.3 i u ≤−  would never partici-
pate in treatment and observations with  0.2 i u >  would always participate regardless of region of resi-
dence. The total complier subpopulation is the largest subpopulation for which a treatment effect is identi-
fied. 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
est and highest, respectively, treatment inclination. However, because the observations in region s are completely 
neglected in the estimator  r|t ˆ θ , in finite samples a weighted average of  ||| ˆˆˆ ,, rs rt st θ θθ  might yield a more precise es-41 
Table A.1 Simulation designs 
  Design 1  Design 2  Design 3  Design 4  Design 5  Design 6 
2
α σ   64 4  0 64 4 0 
2
β σ   9 9 9 9 9  9 
2
u σ   1 1 1 9 9  9 
αβ ρ   0.3 0.3  0  0.3 0.3 0 
u α ρ   0.5 0.5  0  0.5 0.5 0 
u β ρ   0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9  0.9 
Fraction treated (in %)  53  51 
Treated in region r/s/t  42 / 50 / 62  47 / 50 / 54 
Complier r-t (in %)  20  7 
Complier r-s / s-t  8 / 12  3 / 4 
ATE / ATET / ATEN  1.00 / 3.00 / -1.27  1.00 / 3.11 / -1.20 
r|t θ  /  r|s θ  /  s|t θ   0.87 / 1.27 / 0.60  0.96 / 1.09 / 0.87 
Note: ATE is the average treatment effect, ATET is the average treatment effect on the treated. ATEN is the average 
effect on the non-treated.  r|s θ  is the effect for the subpopulation that would not be treated in region r, but treated in 
region s.  s|t θ  is defined analogously.  r|t θ  is the average treatment effect for the total complier subpopulation. 
 
Six different designs of the covariance matrix Ω are examined, which are summarised in Table A.1. In the 
first three rows the variances of  ,, ii i u αβ  are given and in the subsequent three rows the correlations be-
tween these variables. All designs are characterised by a strong correlation between  i β  and  i u , which im-
plies that the average treatment effect differs substantially from the treatment effect on the treated, the ef-
fect on the non-treated and the local average treatment effect (shown in the lower half of the Table). 
In the first design, the variance of the earnings levels is 
2
α σ =64, compared to a variance of the treatment 
effect of 
2
β σ =9. This corresponds to our prior belief, that the variance in earnings is much larger in magni-
tude than the variance in the treatment impacts. Nevertheless, we also examine scenarios where the vari-
ance in earnings is smaller than the variance in impacts (Design 2: 
2
α σ =4 versus 
2
β σ =9) and where the 
variance in earnings is zero (Design 3: 
2
α σ =0 versus 
2
β σ =9). 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
timator. 42 
In all three designs, the size of the total complier subpopulation is 20 %, which is composed of 8% switch-
ing to treatment when transferred from region r to s, and the remaining 12% switching from region s to t. 
Designs 4 to 6 are analogous to the previous designs except for an increase in the variance of the error term 
i u  in the participation equation. This reduces the power of the instrument and the fractions of compliers 
between regions r and s and between regions s and t are now only 3% and 4%, respectively.  
 
In the simulations, the OLS, 2SLS, Fuller and 3 jack-knife estimators are examined. Angrist, Imbens and 
Krueger (1999) and Blomquist and Dahlberg (1999) examined a jack-knifed IV estimator (JIVE) that is 
motivated by the observation that the first-stage fitted values of the 2SLS estimator are correlated with the 
error term in the main equation.
29 To eliminate this correlation, in a leave-one-out approach the first-stage 
coefficients are estimated from the sample with observation i removed. The fitted value  ˆ
i D  of observation i 
is estimated as 
  ( )
1 '' ˆ
ii i i i i D ZZ Z ZD
−
− −− − = , (12) 
where  i Z  is the value of the instrument for observation i and  , ii Z D − −  are the data matrices (including con-
stants) of the full sample without observation i. Let  ˆ
N D  denote the matrix of fitted values  ˆ
i D  for all obser-
vations. With these fitted values the conventional IV estimator is computed as (JIVE1) 
  ( )
1
'' ˆ ˆˆ JIVE
NN N N N D DD Y θ
−
= . 
A modification of this jack-knife IV estimator computes the fitted values  ˆ
i D  by using the leave-one-out 




ii N N i i
N






                                                           
29  See also Phillips and Hale (1977). 43 
Hahn, Hausman and Kuersteiner (2002) propose a Jacknife-2SLS (JN2SLS) estimator to eliminate the bias 
of 2SLS.
30 The finite sample bias of 2SLS is estimated through the jack-knife and subtracted from the 2SLS 
estimator: 











NN N NN N i ii i i i
i
N
NDP D DP Y DP D DP Y
N
, (14) 
where  ,, ii i YDP −− −  are the data and projection matrices when observation i is removed from the sample. 
Both the JIVE and the Jacknife-2SLS estimators possess moments only in the case of overidentification. 
 
The simulation results are given in Tables A.2 to A.7 for the six different designs and for sample sizes 400 
and 1600. In the first eight columns, the results for different estimators  r|t ˆ θ  are given, where only the ob-
servations in regions r and t are used. With respect to mean squared error, the Fuller(4) estimator is always 
the best, followed by the Fuller(1) estimator, which is slightly worse than OLS when the instrument is very 
weak and the sample size is small (designs 4 to 6, with 400 observations). With respect to mean absolute 
error, median squared error and median absolute error, Fuller(1) performs somewhat better than Fuller(4). 
OLS is always worse than Fuller(1) and Fuller(4). As the estimators 2SLS, JIVE1, JIVE2, JN2SLS have no 
finite-sample moments, their MSE does not exist. But they also perform clearly worse than Fuller(1) and 
Fuller(4) with respect to the median error measures, particularly the JIVE estimators. 
In the right half of the Tables A.2 to A.7, the results for the aggregated LATE are shown. The complier 
treatment effects are estimated pair-wise for the three regions by the Fuller estimator and the three estimates 
r|s r|t ˆˆ , θθ  and  s|t ˆ θ  are weighted by different schemes. Six different weighting schemes (with and without bias 
                                                           
30  Donald and Newey (2001) also considered a bias adjusted version of 2SLS where  /( 2) kNNL = −+  is chosen. 
In the particular setting considered in this paper, the B2SLS estimator is very similar to the Fuller ( 1 α = ) estima-
tor and not further considered here. With one endogenous variable and one instrument ( 1 L = ), the system is exactly 
identified. Hence,  1 LIML k =  and the Fuller ( 1 α = ) estimator is [ ]
1
'' NNN N D WD D WY
−
 with  (2 ) NN WN P I =− + , whereas 
for B2SLS  NN WN PI =+ . 44 
correction) are examined. As most of these weighting schemes depend on estimates of the bias and the co-
variances of  r|s r|t s|t ˆˆ ˆ ˆ (,,) ' θ= θ θ θ , for each Monte Carlo sample the bias  ˆ b  and the covariance matrix  ˆ Σ  are 
estimated through 1'000 bootstrap draws. The results for the six different weighting schemes are given 
separately for the Fuller(1) and for the Fuller(4) estimator. 
In the first column,  ˆ θ  is weighted by the estimated complier fraction, and in the second column, the bias 
corrected estimate  ˆ ˆ b θ −  is weighted by the complier fraction. The complier fraction for  r|s ˆ θ  is estimated as 
the difference between the treatment probability in region r and in region s: 
1( ) 1( )
1( ) 1( )




∑⋅ = ∑⋅ =
−
∑= ∑=
, and analogously for  r|t ˆ θ  and  s|t ˆ θ .
31 In columns 3 and 4, the estimate 
ˆ θ  and the bias corrected estimate  ˆ ˆ b θ − , respectively, are weighted by  ˆ
opt
Var w , and in columns 5 and 6 they 
are weighted by  ˆ
opt
MSE w . These optimal weights are estimated as  ( )
1




Var w ι ιι  and 
()
1
11 ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆ ( ') / '( ')
−
−− =Σ + Σ +
opt
MSE wb b b b ι ιι . 
Tables A.2 to A.7 show that, generally, weighting by the complier fractions leads to a very large MSE. The 
compliers-weighted average seems to be highly susceptible to the occurrence of zero or near-zero denomi-
nators. Turning to the Fuller(4) estimator with  ˆ
opt
Var w  or  ˆ
opt
MSE w  weighting, it can be seen that the inclusion of 
the region s did not lead to more precise estimates. Compared to using only the estimate  r|t ˆ θ , weighting by 
ˆ
opt
Var w  or  ˆ
opt
MSE w  often leads to a substantial deterioration in MSE. This is different for the Fuller(1) estimator, 
where the results are more favourable to weighting. For all scenarios and sample sizes, weighting by  ˆ
opt
Var w  
or  ˆ
opt
MSE w  leads to a lower MSE compared to using only the estimate  r|t ˆ θ . Apart from the designs where 
earnings do not vary across persons (
2
α σ =0, designs 3 and 6), the aggregated LATE with Fuller(1) has low-
                                                           
31  If  r|s r|t s|t ˆˆˆ ,, θθθ  were estimated by the Wald (=2SLS) estimator, the compliers weighted average would be identical 
to weighting by (0,1,0), because the other terms cancel. 45 
est MSE in all designs and usually performs best also with respect to the other error measures. The reduc-
tions in MSE can be up to 30% (in design 1 with sample size 1600). Generally, the different weighting 
schemes lead to rather similar results, where the weights ˆ
opt
Var w  (without bias correction) yield most often the 
lowest MSE. 
The reason for the different behaviour of the aggregated LATE estimators with Fuller(1) versus Fuller(4) 
seems to be that Fuller(1) tends to have a higher variance but a lower bias than Fuller(4). The higher vari-
ance of the Fuller(1) estimator can be ameliorated through including the observations of region s and 
weighting the three estimates  r|s ˆ θ ,  r|t ˆ θ  and  s|t ˆ θ . This, however, does not seem to work to reduce the bias of 
the Fuller(4) estimator. Taken together, although no strong conclusions can be drawn from this limited 
Monte Carlo study, the Fuller(1) estimator with variance-weighting seems to be most suited to our applica-
tion.   
Table A.2: Scenario 1: () ()
222 ,, 6 4 , 9 , 1 = u αβ σσσ  
  Aggregated LATE (weighted average of ||| ˆˆˆ ,, rs rt st θ θθ ) 
 
| ˆ
rt θ  





2SLS JIVE1 JIVE2  JN2SLS F(1)  F(4)  ˆcomplier w   ˆ
opt
Var w   ˆ
opt
MSE w   ˆcomplier w   ˆ
opt
Var w   ˆ
opt
MSE w  
Sample size 400       ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ −   ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ −
Median 9.09 1.78 6.86 6.22 6.35 4.45 6.67 3.72 3.10 5.73 5.30 5.82 5.48 6.28 5.82 7.76 7.50 7.79 7.58 
Bias  8.23  .  .  4.94  .  3.56 5.63 2.73 1.58 4.67 4.07 4.76 4.24 5.54 5.07 6.72 6.45 6.76 6.51 
Stdc 1.32  . . . .  6.73  3.68  21.91  26.77  3.78  4.54 3.72 4.33  18.27  21.71  1.99 2.25 1.97 2.20 
MeanSE 69.40  .  .  .  .  56.59 45.25 487.2 718.8 36.05 37.16 36.45 36.70 364.3 497.0 49.13 46.65 49.61 47.18 
MeanAE  8.26  .  .  .  .  6.02 5.87 8.38 9.96 5.17 5.13 5.24 5.15 7.24 7.32 6.73 6.47 6.77 6.53 
MedSE  67.77 55.44  .  .  47.70 26.93 33.97 24.02 29.91 24.91 22.55 25.68 23.84 31.10 27.18 47.58 44.04 47.98 45.08 
MedAE 8.23 7.44  11.78  12.00  6.90 5.19 5.82 4.90 5.47 4.99 4.75 5.07 4.88 5.58 5.21 6.90 6.64 6.93 6.71 
                     
Sample size 1600                   
Median 9.08 0.88 -0.59  -0.60 2.02 1.71 3.34 1.91 1.96 2.63 2.67 2.66 2.69 3.54 3.30 5.25 5.02 5.23 5.02 
Bias  8.22 -1.18 -4.61 -7.20 11.79 0.41  2.41  0.48  0.31  1.65 1.64 1.63 1.64 2.34 2.08 4.07 3.86 4.03 3.84 
Stdc  0.65  12.00  468.0  449.4  970.5  5.10 3.50 7.94 8.22 3.15 3.31 3.15 3.28 6.26 6.38 2.39 2.57 2.41 2.57 
MeanSE 68.19 145.8  .  .  .  26.24 18.06 63.16 67.56 12.62 13.64 12.54 13.40 44.57 44.97 22.23 21.52 22.03 21.35 
MeanAE 8.22  5.22 24.09  21.49  31.29 4.06 3.48 3.89 4.19 2.89 3.01 2.87 2.99 3.59 3.61 4.21 4.08 4.19 4.07 
MedSE  67.52 13.16 22.18 21.75 10.26 10.84  9.04  9.11  9.87  6.73 7.18 6.51 7.18 8.58 8.14  19.30  17.34  19.05  17.39 
MedAE 8.27 3.68 4.71 4.66 3.20 3.29 3.01 3.02 3.14 2.59 2.68 2.55 2.68 2.93 2.85 4.39 4.16 4.37 4.17 
Note:   First eight columns give results for the complier treatment effect with respect to region r versus region t for OLS, 2SLS, JIVE1, JIVE2, JN2SLS, Fuller(1) and Fuller(4). Ob-
servations in region s are not used. 10'000 replications. Values larger 1'000 are not displayed. The subsequent columns provide the results for the aggregated LATE, where 
||| ˆˆˆ (,,) rs rt st θ θθ  are estimated either by Fuller(1) or Fuller(4) and weighted by different weighting schemes.  ˆcomplier w  refers to weighting by the estimated complier fraction, 
estimated as  ˆˆ [| ] [| ] =− = s r E DZ z EDZ z  for  | ˆ
rs θ , and analogously for  | ˆ
rt θ  and  | ˆ
st θ .  ˆ
opt
Var w  refers to the optimal weights with respect to the variance of the aggre-
gated LATE, and  ˆ
opt
MSE w  refers to its MSE.  ˆ θ  means that the weighted average of the estimates  ||| ˆˆˆ (,,) rs rt st θ θθ  is taken, whereas  ˆ ˆ b θ −  refers to the average of the bias 
corrected estimates. The bias and covariance matrix of  ˆ θ  are estimated (within each Monte Carlo replication) from 1'000 bootstrap draws. Results based on about 1'500 
Monte Carlo replications for sample size 400, and 500 replications for sample size 1'600. 47 
Table A.3: Scenario 2: () ()
222 ,, 4 , 9 , 1 u αβ σσσ =  
  Aggregated LATE (weighted average of ||| ˆˆˆ ,, rs rt st θ θθ ) 
 
| ˆ
rt θ  





2SLS JIVE1 JIVE2  JN2SLS F(1)  F(4)  ˆcomplier w   ˆ
opt
Var w   ˆ
opt
MSE w   ˆcomplier w   ˆ
opt
Var w   ˆ
opt
MSE w  
Sample size 400       ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ −   ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ −
Median 4.33 1.32 3.29 2.93 3.27 2.37 3.29 2.31 1.99 3.18 2.98 3.26 3.08 3.23 3.03 4.03 3.92 4.06 3.97 
Bias  3.46  .  .  3.25  .  1.44 2.39 1.63 1.21 2.22 1.98 2.27 2.06 2.46 2.25 3.08 2.97 3.10 3.00 
Stdc 0.42  . . . .  2.27  1.20  20.27  27.27  1.28  1.53 1.28 1.48 8.38 9.83 0.66 0.75 0.66 0.74 
MeanSE  12.17  .  .  .  . 7.24  7.17 .  . 6.58  6.27  6.76  6.42 .  . 9.93  9.37  10.05  9.52 
MeanAE  3.46  .  .  24.32  .  2.20 2.42 3.88 4.63 2.30 2.19 2.34 2.24 3.18 3.16 3.08 2.97 3.10 3.00 
MedSE 11.98  6.29  21.82  22.43  7.60 3.51 5.86 3.38 3.99 5.37 4.65 5.77 5.04 5.84 4.89  10.04  9.37  10.20  9.62 
MedAE 3.46 2.51 4.67 4.74 2.76 1.87 2.42 1.84 2.00 2.32 2.16 2.40 2.25 2.42 2.21 3.17 3.06 3.19 3.10 
                     
Sample size 1600                   
Median 4.33 0.90 0.25 0.25 1.40 1.20 1.89 1.32 1.35 1.74 1.75 1.74 1.76 2.05 1.96 2.79 2.67 2.78 2.69 
Bias  3.47 -0.56 -1.55 -5.15 18.01 0.14  1.00  0.31  0.24  0.73 0.71 0.72 0.71 1.07 0.95 1.83 1.74 1.81 1.72 
Stdc  0.21 6.70  .  .  .  1.77 1.13 1.60 1.85 1.13 1.23 1.13 1.21 1.41 1.57 0.88 0.94 0.89 0.94 
MeanSE  12.09  45.16  .  .  .  3.17 2.28 2.65 3.48 1.81 2.00 1.80 1.97 3.13 3.35 4.11 3.89 4.06 3.86 
MeanAE  3.47 1.98 7.45 9.83  23.75  1.39 1.25 1.27 1.41 1.11 1.16 1.10 1.15 1.36 1.35 1.84 1.77 1.83 1.76 
MedSE 12.04  1.62 2.82 2.76 1.25 1.33 1.28 1.29 1.47 1.06 1.22 1.03 1.21 1.55 1.44 3.72 3.27 3.67 3.32 
MedAE 3.47 1.27 1.68 1.66 1.12 1.15 1.13 1.14 1.21 1.03 1.11 1.02 1.10 1.25 1.20 1.93 1.81 1.92 1.82 
Note:   See note below Table A.2. Values larger than 100 are not displayed. 48 
Table A.4: Scenario 3: () ()
222 , , 0,9,1 u αβ σσσ =  
  Aggregated LATE (weighted average of ||| ˆˆˆ ,, rs rt st θ θθ ) 
 
| ˆ
rt θ  





2SLS JIVE1 JIVE2  JN2SLS F(1)  F(4)  ˆcomplier w   ˆ
opt
Var w   ˆ
opt
MSE w   ˆcomplier w   ˆ
opt
Var w   ˆ
opt
MSE w  
Sample size 400       ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ −   ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ −
Median 2.75 1.13 2.31 2.16 2.32 1.71 2.21 1.73 1.56 2.30 2.19 2.34 2.25 2.15 2.01 2.74 2.70 2.76 2.71 
Bias  1.88  .  0.98 5.42  .  0.78 1.31 0.69 0.42 1.37 1.22 1.38 1.26 1.20 1.06 1.85 1.78 1.86 1.79 
Stdc  0.24  .  .  .  .  1.36 0.69 7.75 9.57 0.76 0.95 0.76 0.91 3.29 3.77 0.37 0.44 0.37 0.43 
MeanSE  3.61  . . . .  2.45  2.21  60.57  91.67  2.44  2.39 2.47 2.40  12.27  15.33  3.55 3.36 3.58 3.40 
MeanAE  1.88  .  12.57  14.63  .  1.25 1.34 2.05 2.43 1.42 1.37 1.43 1.38 1.71 1.69 1.85 1.78 1.86 1.79 
MedSE 3.53 2.28 7.39 7.56 2.61 1.23 1.80 1.31 1.57 2.08 1.82 2.18 1.98 1.75 1.50 3.53 3.35 3.57 3.42 
MedAE 1.88 1.51 2.72 2.75 1.62 1.11 1.34 1.15 1.25 1.44 1.35 1.48 1.41 1.32 1.23 1.88 1.83 1.89 1.85 
                     
Sample size 1600                   
Median 2.75 0.89 0.51 0.52 1.19 1.05 1.43 1.09 1.11 1.38 1.36 1.37 1.35 1.50 1.44 2.04 1.95 2.03 1.95 
Bias  1.89 -0.25 -0.50 -0.32 41.10 0.04  0.52  0.10  0.06  0.45 0.43 0.44 0.42 0.58 0.51 1.10 1.03 1.08 1.02 
Stdc  0.12 7.53  45.69  55.47  .  1.08 0.68 1.06 1.23 0.74 0.80 0.74 0.79 0.65 0.73 0.54 0.59 0.55 0.59 
MeanSE  3.57  56.70  .  .  .  1.16 0.75 1.12 1.52 0.74 0.82 0.74 0.81 0.76 0.79 1.49 1.40 1.47 1.39 
MeanAE  1.89 1.19 5.02 4.50  45.56  0.83 0.71 0.81 0.89 0.72 0.75 0.71 0.74 0.73 0.73 1.12 1.07 1.11 1.06 
MedSE 3.56 0.57 1.02 0.99 0.43 0.47 0.43 0.48 0.55 0.45 0.49 0.42 0.48 0.47 0.44 1.37 1.19 1.36 1.19 
MedAE 1.89 0.76 1.01 1.00 0.65 0.69 0.65 0.69 0.74 0.67 0.70 0.65 0.69 0.68 0.67 1.17 1.09 1.16 1.09 
Note:   See note below Table A.2. Values larger than 100 are not displayed. 49 
Table A.5: Scenario 4: () ()
222 ,, 6 4 , 9 , 9 = u αβ σσσ  
  Aggregated LATE (weighted average of ||| ˆˆˆ ,, rs rt st θ θθ ) 
 
| ˆ
rt θ  





2SLS JIVE1 JIVE2  JN2SLS F(1)  F(4)  ˆcomplier w   ˆ
opt
Var w   ˆ
opt
MSE w   ˆcomplier w   ˆ
opt
Var w   ˆ
opt
MSE w  
Sample size 400       ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ −   ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ −
Median 9.38 7.45 9.67 9.76 9.29 8.87 9.17 8.25 7.87 8.90 8.65 8.98 8.74 9.08 8.96 9.27 9.22 9.28 9.23 
Bias  8.48  .  .  .  .  7.75 8.11 7.43 6.91 7.91 7.70 7.96 7.79 8.11 7.99 8.29 8.23 8.30 8.24 
Stdc 1.29  . . . .  6.37  2.95  32.86  47.42  3.36  4.46 3.16 4.08  17.47  21.74  1.47 1.73 1.43 1.66 
MeanSE 75.04  .  .  .  .  100.1 74.55 .  .  73.75 79.18 73.33 77.32 370.8 536.7 70.84 70.62 70.92 70.66 
MeanAE  8.48  . . . .  8.58  8.13  11.89  14.66  7.97  7.94 8.01 7.96 9.51 9.94 8.29 8.23 8.30 8.24 
MedSE  71.19 227.6 104.8 110.9 214.9 64.96 67.59 66.80 81.00 63.38 59.64 64.58 61.12 67.55 66.54 69.31 68.49 69.42 68.66 
MedAE  8.46 15.08  10.23  10.56  14.66 8.05  8.22 8.17 9.00 7.96 7.72 8.04 7.82 8.22 8.16 8.33 8.28 8.33 8.29 
                     
Sample size 1600                   
Median 9.39 3.78 9.42 9.48 8.29 6.95 8.34 6.48 5.66 7.32 6.73 7.50 6.99 7.80 7.45 8.60 8.40 8.66 8.41 
Bias  8.45  .  10.67  11.17  .  5.63 7.05 2.74 0.80 6.33 5.80 6.42 5.96 9.26 9.61 7.64 7.46 7.68 7.51 
Stdc  0.68  .  324.9  824.2  .  6.59  3.18 156.3  211.6 3.68 4.68 3.56 4.39  59.70  73.93  1.44 1.71 1.40 1.64 
MeanSE 71.82  .  .  .  .  75.18 59.86 .  .  53.55 55.52 53.81 54.76  .  .  60.42 58.49 60.92 59.06 
MeanAE 8.45  .  43.46  59.33  .  7.14  7.12 20.01  25.35 6.56  6.43 6.66 6.51  11.86  12.83  7.64 7.46 7.68 7.51 
MedSE  71.34 107.7 126.7 130.8 91.44 43.08 54.67 39.97 50.21 40.71 35.84 42.94 37.52 49.01 43.69 58.51 55.45 59.43 55.71 
MedAE 8.45  10.39  11.28  11.48  9.56 6.58 7.39 6.32 7.09 6.38 5.99 6.55 6.13 7.00 6.61 7.65 7.45 7.71 7.46 
Note:   See note below Table A.2. Values larger than 1'000 are not displayed. 50 
Table A.6: Scenario 5: () ()
222 ,, 4 , 9 , 9 u αβ σσσ =  
  Aggregated LATE (weighted average of ||| ˆˆˆ ,, rs rt st θ θθ ) 
 
| ˆ
rt θ  





2SLS JIVE1 JIVE2  JN2SLS F(1)  F(4)  ˆcomplier w   ˆ
opt
Var w   ˆ
opt
MSE w   ˆcomplier w   ˆ
opt
Var w   ˆ
opt
MSE w  
Sample size 400       ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ −   ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ −
Median  4.60 3.81 4.75 4.82 4.63 4.38 4.51 4.13 4.00 4.46 4.41 4.50 4.43 4.48 4.42 4.63 4.62 4.62 4.62 
Bias  3.66  .  4.55 8.95  .  3.35 3.52 2.99 2.74 3.48 3.39 3.50 3.42 3.36 3.26 3.66 3.64 3.67 3.64 
Stdc  0.41  . . . .  2.07  0.95  16.41  23.32  1.08  1.42 1.02 1.31 6.30 7.75 0.48 0.56 0.47 0.54 
MeanSE 13.58  .  .  .  .  15.52 13.30 .  .  13.25 13.48 13.28 13.39 50.86 70.69 13.62 13.52 13.65 13.55 
MeanAE  3.66  .  13.81  17.03  .  3.47 3.52 4.99 5.89 3.49 3.42 3.51 3.45 4.00 4.10 3.66 3.64 3.67 3.64 
MedSE 13.36 26.11 17.56 18.41 30.63 11.77 12.64 11.43 11.97 12.35 11.95 12.58 12.13 12.65 12.29 13.54 13.43 13.50 13.49 
MedAE  3.66 5.11 4.19 4.29 5.54 3.43 3.56 3.38 3.46 3.51 3.46 3.55 3.48 3.56 3.51 3.68 3.67 3.67 3.67 
                     
Sample size 1600                   
Median 4.61 2.258 4.64  4.64  4.17  3.49 4.14 3.33 3.07 3.86 3.65 3.93 3.78 3.96 3.80 4.38 4.31 4.40 4.33 
Bias  3.67  .  23.43  7.22  .  2.48 3.08 2.27 1.84 2.83 2.62 2.88 2.70 2.97 2.81 3.40 3.32 3.42 3.35 
Stdc  0.20  . . . .  2.25  1.07  10.73  13.52  1.23  1.59 1.18 1.48 6.10 7.03 0.50 0.60 0.48 0.57 
MeanSE 13.48  .  .  .  .  11.19 10.62 .  .  9.54  9.41  9.67  9.46  45.96 57.28 11.79 11.40 11.90 11.52 
MeanAE  3.66  .  40.14  31.9  .  2.79 3.08 4.40 5.23 2.86 2.74 2.91 2.79 3.69 3.75 3.40 3.32 3.42 3.35 
MedSE 13.42 13.08 21.07 21.94 15.25  6.88  10.18 7.33  7.41  8.46 7.47 8.91 8.03 9.32 8.54  11.79  11.34  11.90  11.46 
MedAE  3.66 3.62 4.59 4.68 3.91 2.62 3.19 2.71 2.72 2.91 2.73 2.99 2.83 3.05 2.92 3.43 3.37 3.45 3.39 
Note:   See note below Table A.2. Values larger than 100 are not displayed. 51 
Table A.7: Scenario 6: () ()
222 , , 0,9,9 u αβ σσσ =  
  Aggregated LATE (weighted average of ||| ˆˆˆ ,, rs rt st θ θθ ) 
 
| ˆ
rt θ  





2SLS JIVE1 JIVE2  JN2SLS F(1)  F(4)  ˆcomplier w   ˆ
opt
Var w   ˆ
opt
MSE w   ˆcomplier w   ˆ
opt
Var w   ˆ
opt
MSE w  
Sample size 400       ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ −   ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ − ˆ θ   ˆ ˆ b θ −
Median  3.01 2.62 3.10 3.13 3.02 2.90 2.96 2.83 2.74 2.96 2.92 2.98 2.94 2.96 2.92 3.06 3.04 3.06 3.05 
Bias  2.07  .  2.49 2.52  .  1.93 2.01 1.88 1.80 2.01 1.96 2.03 1.98 1.93 1.88 2.11 2.10 2.11 2.10 
Stdc  0.25  .  .  .  .  1.25 0.56 6.81 9.57 0.65 0.88 0.61 0.80 2.75 3.35 0.28 0.34 0.27 0.32 
MeanSE  4.73  . . . .  5.29  4.34  49.90  94.79  4.47  4.61 4.47 4.56  11.30  14.77  4.54 4.51 4.55 4.51 
MeanAE  2.07  .  8.16  11.41  .  2.01 2.01 2.80 3.30 2.02 1.98 2.03 2.00 2.28 2.33 2.11 2.10 2.11 2.10 
MedSE  4.25 9.64 5.71 6.05  11.12  3.81 4.06 3.89 4.14 4.05 3.88 4.12 3.97 4.13 4.00 4.44 4.38 4.46 4.40 
MedAE  2.06 3.11 2.39 2.46 3.33 1.95 2.01 1.97 2.03 2.01 1.97 2.03 1.99 2.03 2.00 2.11 2.09 2.11 2.10 
                     
Sample size 1600                   
Median  3.02 1.71 3.04 3.04 2.77 2.40 2.75 2.31 2.17 2.65 2.53 2.69 2.60 2.68 2.63 2.95 2.93 2.97 2.93 
Bias  2.07  .  0.85 3.22  .  1.40 1.74 1.22 0.77 1.69 1.58 1.72 1.62 1.77 1.65 1.99 1.95 2.00 1.96 
Stdc  0.12  . . . .  1.35  0.63  29.34  39.45  0.76  0.98 0.73 0.91  13.24  16.14  0.33 0.40 0.32 0.38 
MeanSE  4.30 .  .  .  . 3.82  3.43 .  . 3.43  3.44  3.48  3.47 .  . 4.07  3.97  4.10  4.00 
MeanAE  2.07  .  11.06  11.50  .  1.62 1.74 4.74 5.98 1.72 1.66 1.75 1.69 3.10 3.36 1.99 1.95 2.00 1.97 
MedSE  4.29 4.33 6.77 7.13 4.76 2.28 3.22 2.61 3.14 2.89 2.56 3.04 2.74 3.29 3.05 4.02 3.90 4.06 3.94 
MedAE  2.07 2.08 2.60 2.67 2.18 1.51 1.80 1.62 1.77 1.70 1.60 1.74 1.66 1.82 1.75 2.00 1.97 2.01 1.98 
Note:   See note below Table A.2. Values larger than 100 are not displayed.   
Appendix B: Data and Institutions 
B.1 AVAM/ASAL/AHV  Database 
The empirical analysis is based on data from two administrative sources, matched by a unique person 
identifier. Data were obtained for all of the approximately 180'000 persons registered unemployed on De-
cember 31, 1997. The first data source is the information system for placement and labour market statis-
tics (AVAM) and the unemployment offices payment system (ASAL). These data provide detailed infor-
mation about the unemployment history, ALMP participation and personal characteristics for the period 
1996 to 1999.
32 These data were merged with the social security records (AHV) for a random subsample 
of about 80'000 individuals. These social security data contain monthly information on the individual la-
bour market histories and earnings (including self-employment) on a monthly basis for the period 1988 to 
1999. These social security data allow us to examine the effects of active labour market programmes on 
employment as well as on earnings. 
Sample selection  
In order to focus on the mobile population, as described in Section 3, various sample selection rules were 
applied. These are detailed in Table B.1 together with the ensuing loss of observations. 
                                                           
32  E.g. information on place of residence, mother tongue, foreign languages, number of dependent persons, disabil-
ity, education, qualification, caseworker’s assessment of employability, information about last job, looking for 
part-time or full-time job, beginning and end of entitlement period, benefit payments, sanction days, sickness 
benefits, participation in labour market programmes, and temporary wage subsidies. AVAM: Arbeitsvermittlung 
und Arbeitsmarktstatistik, ASAL: Auszahlungssystem der Arbeitslosenkassen, AHV: Alters- und Hinterlassenen-
versicherung. The data were merged by Jonathan Gast (seco). 53 
Table B.1: Sample selection 
  Remaining observations 
Original sample  81'399 obs 
Delete all students, apprentices, homeworkers  80'775 obs 
Delete all foreigners with less than yearly work permit  79'610 obs 
Delete age < 25 or age > 55  75'992 obs 
Delete if insured monthly earnings < 1000 CHF  70'474 obs 
Delete if partly employed  68'190 obs 
Delete if disabled or exhausted unemployment benefits (ausgesteuert) → Final sample  66'713 obs 
Note:   66'713 observations. a 1 CHF ≈ 2/3 Euro. 
Table B.2 shows descriptive statistics for the treated and the non-treated. 60% of all unemployed entered 
active labour market programmes (with the average month of entry being March 1998). Generally, the 
characteristics of treated and non-treated are very similar except for slightly higher earnings of the treated 
in the years up to 1997 and worse outcomes in 1998. The aggregate figures for the treated, however, hide 
substantial variation between the participants in training, employment programmes and temporary wage 
subsidies, as can be seen in Gerfin and Lechner (2002). 34% of the treated received training, 22% partici-
pated in an employment programme, 42% became employed in a temporary wage subsidy, and the re-
maining 1% participated in other labour market programmes. 
B.2  Regional employment offices and descriptive statistics 
Table B.3 gives a list of all regional employment offices. The first column contains an identification num-
ber. The second column indicates the canton, and the third column gives the name of the regional em-
ployment office. In the last column, the number of observations in the selected sample (see Table B.1) is 
given. The REO that are included in any of the 30 local labour markets are marked in bold. 54 
Table B.2: Descriptive statistics (Means of shares) 
Variable name  Treated  Non-treated 
Age  38.2  37.3 
Female  45  41 
Married  59  59 
Number of dependent persons  2.5  2.4 
Work permit (for foreigners):   yearly permit (B)  16  16 
    residence  permit  (C)    28  29 
    Swiss  national  56  55 
Mother  tongue:    German  34  34 
    French  20  20 
    I t a l i a n   11  11 
    O t h e r   35  36 
Qualification:    occupation  specific  skills  56  56 
    some  occupation  specific  skills  15  15 
    no  occupations  specific  skills  29  29 
Assessment of potential employability: very good  5  7 
 by  caseworker   good  16  16 
    m e d i u m   56  55 
    d i f f i c u l t   16  15 
    v e r y   d i f f i c u l t   2  2 
Insured earnings (CHF) a  3'980  3'832 
Employment history 1988-1997     
Number of previous unemployment spells  2.0  2.2 
Average duration of unemployment spells (months)  5.4  5.1 
Number of employment spells  2.5  2.7 
Average duration of employment spells (months)  50.6  47.2 
Has been self-employed some time in 1993-1997  5.0  5.4 
Average monthly earnings from employment  1988-1989  2'682  2'557 
     1990-1991  3'081  2'988 
     1992-1993  3'072  2'985 
     1994-1995  3'175  3'092 
     1996-1997  2'757  2'620 
Treatment status in 1998     
Month of entry  March 1998   
  of which received training  34  - 
  of which participated in employment programme  22  - 
  of which engaged in a temporary wage subsidy  42  - 
  of which entered in other labour market programmes  1  - 
    
Outcome variables    
Employed    average  for  January-April  1999  45  53 
     average  for  May-August  1999  59  63 
     average  for  September-December  1999 66  64 
High earnings (> 90% of insured earnings)   average for January-April 1999  27  35 
     average  for  May-August  1999  35  42 
     average  for  September-December  1999 37  42 
Labour earnings (from wage and    average for January-April 1999  1'714  2'091 
   self-employment) in CHF     average for May-August 1999  2'218  2'455 
     average  for  September-December  1999 2'408  2'470 
Observations 40'193  26'520 
Note:   66'713 observations. a 1 CHF ≈ 2/3 Euro. 55 
Table B.3: Regional employment offices (REO) 
No  Can
ton  Name of regional office  Obs    No  Can
ton  Name of regional office  Obs 
1  ZH  Opfikon  733    51    Kriens  485 
2    Marthalen 115    52    Sursee 399 
3    Winterthur 1221   53    Wolhusen  154 
4    Effretikon 320    54  UR  Altdorf 150 
5    Uster 928    55  SZ  Goldau 337 
6    Wetzikon 719    56    Lachen 529 
7    Bülach-Nord 305    57  OW Hergiswil, OW  110 
8    Meilen 474    58  NW  Hergiswil, NW  155 
9    Thalwil 947   59  GL  Glarus  129 
10   Affoltern  a.A.  277    60   Schwanden  135 
11    Dietikon 767    61  ZG  Zug 571 
12    Regensdorf 393    64  FR  Châtel-St.Denis 107 
13   Ausstell.  607    65    Murten, See-B.  197 
14   Ausstell.  537    198  FRD2  2 
15   Flösserg.  471    66    Tafers, Sense-  201 
16   Flösserg.  360    67    Romont, Glâne  143 
18   Schwamend  a  291  68    Fribourg, Sar.  860 
19   Hohlstr.  291    200  FRL2  5 
20   Bäckerstr.  615    205  FRL3  8 
21   Badenerstr  511    212  Städtisches  Arbeitsamt  Fribourg  55 
22   Eggbühlstr  810    69   Bulle,Gruyère  319 
23   Lagerstr.  492    201  FRM2  2 
216 BE BEAa  1    70    Estavayer le lac,Bro  228 
27    Mittell. Gümlingen  416    71  SO  Trimbach 104 
28    Mittell. Zollikofen  369    74    Grenchen 191 
29    Mittell. Liebefeld-Köniz  456    75    Solothurn 440 
30   BE-Oberl.  Unterseen  366    76    Oensingen 181 
214  BEAG  16    77    Olten 336 
32   Spiez  223    78    Breitenbach 159 
33   BE-Oberl.  Meiringen  79    79    Biberist 125 
35   Emmental,Langnau  94    80    Schönenwerd 131 
36    Oberaargau, Wangen  202    81    Zuchwil 131 
37    Lyss (Seeland)  329   196  BS  BSA2  3 
38   Moutier  124    82    Basel,RAV 1, Hochstr  783 
39    Jura La Neuveville  49    83    Basel, Utengasse  760 
40    Jura St.Imier  91    208    KIGA Basel, LAM  56 
41    SubRav Bern-West Lagerhausweg  813    84    Basel, RAV 2, Hochstr  538 
42    SubRav. Bern-Ost Kasterhoferstr.  666   194  BL  BLA1  14 
215  BEAZ  2    87    Pratteln 338 
43   Jura,  Tavannes  123    197  BLD2  1 
204  BEA3  2    88    Münchenstein 256 
44    Biel 945   199    BLE2  2 
210  BEA6  3    89    Binningen 340 
45    Burgdorf 303   90    Liestal  287 
46    Langenthal 313    91    Laufen 86 
47   Oberl.  Thun  S.  858    92   Gelterkinden  155 
48  LU  Luzern 538    93  SH  Schaffhausen 605 
49    Emmen 429    94  AR  Herisau 247 
50    Emmenbrücke 155    95  AI  Appenzell 39 
 56 
193 SG SGA1  1    140    Echallens  163 
96    St.Gallen 1022    141    Vevey 654 
97    Rorschach 348   142    Prilly  263 
98    Oberuzwil 505    143    Aigle 515 
99    Sargans 207   144    Morges  442 
100  Buchs  168    145  Renens  801 
101  Heerbrugg  417    146    Montreux 411 
102    Rapperswil 360    147    Oron-la-Ville 107 
103  Wattwil  185    148  Orbe  406 
104  GR  Chur 289   149    Pully  378 
189    Gemeindearbeitsamt Stadt Chur  191   150    Aubonne  158 
105  Thusis  80    151  Yverdon  Grand.  617 
106  Ilanz  70    153    Nyon 576 
107    Grono 73    154    Payerne 236 
108  Davos-Platz  76    155    Moudon 119 
109  Samedan  98    156  VS  Monthey 1  367 
110  AG  Zofingen 472    157    Monthey 2  242 
111  Zurzach  214    158  Martigny  1  336 
112  Muri  AG  175    159  Martigny  2  389 
113  Menziken  221    160  Fully  123 
114  Frick  106    161  Sierre  1  372 
192  AGA1  3    162  Sierre  2  319 
115    Aarau, Kunsth.  551   163    Sion  1  238 
116    Baden 572   164    Sion  2  308 
117    Wettingen 484   165    Sion  3  588 
118  Lenzburg  328    166  St-Séverin  114 
119  Brugg  283    167  Brig  1  539 
120    Wohlen 473   168    Brig  2  128 
121  Rheinfelden  233    169  Visp  89 
122  TG  Frauenfeld 537   170    Naters  7 
202    Gemeindearbamt Stadt Frauenfeld  29    171  NE  Mont., La Chaux de Fonds  845 
123  Kreuzlingen  387    172    Litt., Neuchatel  1234 
207  TGP4  1    211  NEA6  1 
124  Weinfelden  227    213  Städtisches  Arbeitsamt  Neuchatel  17 
125    Amriswil 474    179  GE  Ag de Rive  1509 
203  TGQ2  3    180    GE, Carouge  231 
206  TGQ3  3    181    AG d Minot. I  1304 
209  TGQ5  11    182    AG d Minot. II  613 
126  TI  Bellinzona 697    183    AG des Saules  699 
127  Locarno  1495    184    AG des Gares  1344 
128  Lugano  1665    191  GEA1  2 
129  Chiasso  394    195  JU  JUA1  1 
130  Biasca  343    186  Delémont  266 
131  VD  Lausanne Chaud. 9  2010    187    Porrentruy  237 
132    Lausanne Chaud. 7  140    188    Saignelégier  46 
Note:   All regional employment offices with at least one observation in the selected sample. Marked in bold are all REO in-
cluded in any of the 30 local labour markets. a Oberwiesenstrasse 66  
Appendix C: Local labour markets 
Table C.1: Commuting times by car between regional employment offices (in minutes) 






























  96  St.Gallen       20    16  24            
  97  Rorschach      21            
98  Oberuzwil  27  35  36    22      34      
99  Sargans           22       
100  Buchs               
101  Heerbrugg                
102  Rapperswil        11      34  43  24  19  27 



























































01  Opfikon  30          34    34  38    37  21  21  30  41  33  
02  Marthalen  25        12               
03  Winterthur  20        22               
04  Effretikon  26        29               
05  Uster  35       36                
06  Wetzikon       30                
07  Bülach-Nord         36     29       35  35      
0 8   M e i l e n         3 7                 
09  Thalwil          31              
10  Affoltern          26     17          30   
11  Dietikon            38  30           15  15  24  27  24   
12  Regensdorf                 19  19  28  39  31   
13-23:  ZH  City                 27  27    45  37   
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8 7   P r a t t e l n   1 0                   
8 8   M ü n c h e n s t e i n   1 3                   
89  Binningen 7                  
9 0   L i e s t a l   2 0                   
91  Laufen  25         20           
9 2   G e l t e r k i n d e n   2 4                   
71  Trimbach         28  25  21        20    35 
72  Derendingen           27       43     
74  Grenchen                  
75  Solothurn          31          
76  Oensingen            32  17        34      
77  Olten             32  16      36  15    30 
78  Breitenbach  26    22     5    26           
7 9   B i b e r i s t            3 1           
80  Schönenwerd           20       5     24 
8 1   Z u c h w i l            2 6           
 

























































27  Gümligen 29    26  29       26  42  32  34     27    34     
28  Zollikofen 30    27  30       22  29  29  30     24    30     
29 Liebefeld-
Köniz 
24    24  25       30  46       31       
3 0   U n t e r s e e n                       
4 7   T h u n                       
3 2   S p i e z                       
33  Meiringen                      
44  Biel     39         25            30 
3 5   L a n g n a u                       
36  Wangen          30  9  28  13  8  24    13  32  14     
37  Lyss     29        30  27  36      36       
3 8   M o u t i e r                       
39  La  Neuveville                      15 
4 0   S t . I m i e r                      1 7    
41/42  Bern  23    20  24       26  42  32      27    34     
4 3   T a v a n n e s                       
4 5   B u r g d o r f              2 8       2 2     2 9      
46  Langenthal               36  25  29  19  30  29  39  31  26    
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  68 Fribourg  64 Châtel-St.Denis  65 Murten  66 Tafers  67 Romont  69 Bulle  70 Estavayer le-lac  156/157 Monthey 
131/132  Lausanne    30        
140  Echallens   35    44      
141  Vevey   12      28  27 
142  Prilly    26        
143  Aigle    24        15 
144  Morges          
145  Renens    27        
146  Montreux   15      30  25 
147  Oron-la-Ville   13    21  29    
148  Orbe          
149  Pully    19        
150  Aubonne          
151  Yverdon         25   
153  Nyon          
154  Payerne  28  19  23   9   
155  Moudon   30    18  28  
          
          
          
          
          
  55 Goldau  57/58 Hergiswil  61 Zug  110 Zofingen  122 Frauenfeld       
48  Luzern  26  11  30       
49 Emmen  22  10  26    34       
50 Emmenbrücke  23  10  28    34       
51  Kriens  26 8 31           
52  Sursee 35  23  22        
53  Wolhusen    23        
54  Altdorf  24         
61  Zug  21         
93  Schaffhausen       31     
Note:   The REOs Schlieren (24) and Horgen Süd-Wädenswil (25) are not displayed since the number of observations is zero for these two REOs. 
Commuting times were calculated using http://route.web.de/Europa. Commuting times are in minutes when using a car and driving at medium speed. All commuting times 
between any pair of REOs are shown in the table, if ≤ 30 minutes. Commuting times > 30 minutes are not always displayed. The number in front of the name of the REO cor-
responds to the number of Table B.3. 60
Table C.1 shows the commuting distances between the regional employment offices as calculated using 
http://route.web.de/Europa. With these commuting distances and further considerations on commuting in-
frastructure, 30 local labour markets were identified. These are displayed in Table C.2, together with the 
number of observations in the selected sample. For example, the first row indicates that the areas corre-
sponding to the REOs of Grenchen, Biel and Lyss are considered as a local labour market, where Grenchen 
belongs to the canton Solothurn (SO) and Biel and Lyss belong to the canton Bern (BE). This row further 
shows that 186 observations belong to the REO Grenchen, while the REOs Biel and Lyss together have 
1'109 observations. 
Table C.2: Local labour markets divided by administrative border 
#  Cantons  Regional employment offices  Number of observations 
n1                n2 
1 SO-BE  Grenchen  Biel,  Lyss  186 a 1'109 a 
2  SO-BE  Solothurn, Oensingen, Biberist, Zuchwil  Wangen, Langenthal, Burgdorf  877  818 
3 SO-BL  Breitenbach  Laufen  159  86 
4  SO-AG  Trimbach, Olten, Schönewerd  Zofingen, Aarau  571  1'023 
5  NE-BE  La Chaux de Fonds  St.Imier  845  91 
6 NE-BE  Neuchatel  La  Neuveville  1'234  49 
7 BE-AG  Langenthal  Zofingen  313  472 
8  BE-FR  Gümligen, Zollikofen, Köniz, Bern (2x)  Murten, Tafers, Fribourg  2'660 a 763 a 
9 FR-VD  ChatelSt.Denis  Oron  la  Ville  107  107 
10 FR-VD  Romont,  Estavayer  Payerne,  Moudon  371  355 
11 VD-GE  Nyon  Genf  (6x)  576  5'700 
12  VD-VS  Vevey, Aigle, Montreux  Monthey (2x)  1'580  609 
13 BL-BS  Pratteln,  Münchenstein,  Binningen  Basel  (3x)  934  2'081 
14 LU-AG  Sursee  Zofingen  399  472 
15 LU-NWOW  Luzern, Emmen, Emmenbrücke, Kriens  Hergiswil (2x)  1'607  265 
16  LU-ZG  Luzern, Emmen, Emmenbrücke, Kriens  Zug  1'607  571 
17 SZ-UR  Goldau  Altdorf  337  150 
18 SZ-ZG  Goldau  Zug  337  571 
19 AG-ZH  Baden,  Wettingen,  Wohlen  Opfikon, Effretikon, Uster, Wetzikon, 
Bülach, Dietikon, Regensdorf       1'529 4'165 
20 ZH-SH  Marthalen  Schaffhausen  115  605 
21 ZH-TG  Winterthur  Frauenfeld    1'221  537 
22 ZH-SG  Meilen,  Thalwil  Rapperswil  1'421  360 
23 ZH-SZ  Meilen,  Thalwil  Lachen  1'421  529 
24 TG-SH  Frauenfeld    Schaffhausen  537  605 
25 TG-SG  Amriswil  Rohrschach,  Oberuzwil  474  853 
26 SG-AR  St.Gallen,  Rohrschach  Herisau  1'370  247 
27 AR-AI  Herisau  Appenzell  247  39 
28 SG-SZ  Rapperswil  Lachen  360  529 
29 SG-GR  Sargans  Chur  (2x)  207  480 
30 GR-TI  Grono  Bellinzona  73  697 
Note:  a Number of observations after deleting individuals with French mother-tongue, because a French-German bilingual 
region is bordering a German speaking region.  61
Table C.3 shows various summary statistics for these local labour markets. The first two columns indicate 
the number of the local labour market and the cantonal border that passes through this labour market. Col-
umns three to six are analogous to Table 4.2 and give the percentages treated, the estimated fraction of 
compliers and the differential in the quota per unemployed (as given by Table 2.1).  
Columns 7 to 14 show the ALMP-structure in the REOs of the local labour market, where columns 7 to 10 
refer to the one side of the border and columns 11 to 14 to the other side. The ALMP-structure is presented 
by the percentages of treated participating in training, employment programmes, temporary wage subsidies 
and other programmes, respectively. These columns indicate a non-negligible variation in the types of pro-
grammes to which caseworkers assign their clients. For example, the first row indicates that 13% of the 
participants in the REO Grenchen receive training, while this figure is 29% in the REOs Biel and Lyss. The 
corresponding fractions for employment programmes are 46% in Grenchen and 31% in Biel and Lyss. 
Hence, not only are unemployed living in Grenchen (compared to Biel and Lyss) more likely to be treated 
(76% vs. 67%), they are also more likely to be assigned to employment programmes if treated and less 
likely to receive training. Thus, the treatment itself is different in Grenchen than in Biel and Lyss, which 
may violate assumption 2 of Section 3.1. The criterion 4 of Section 4.3 therefore requires that the ALMP 
should be similar on both sides of the border. With the fractions of the ALMP allocation adding up to 
100%, a convenient approach to implement Criterion 4 is to limit the maximum divergence between the 
corresponding fractions on the two sides of the border. For example, the maximum divergence in the first 
row is 16  (29% training - 13% training). For the second labour market, the maximum divergence is 4  
(39%-35% for employment programmes). Since the choice of a threshold for the maximum divergence is 
somewhat arbitrary, two variants are considered: In the first variant (Selection A) a maximum divergence of 
at most 7 is permitted. This condition is satisfied by only 8 local labour markets, which are marked in the 
second last column of Table C.3.
33 For the second variant (Selection B), the threshold is doubled to include 
                                                           
33  The threshold 7 was chosen, as this is exactly the maximum divergence for four of the 30 labour markets. Hence, a 
smaller threshold would have been satisfied only by four or fewer labour markets.  62
a larger selection of local labour markets in the analysis.
34 Selection B contains 18 local labour markets, 
marked in the last column of Table C.3. For the estimation of the aggregated LATE only the local labour 
markets classified as A or B will be used henceforth, since for the other labour markets the conditions for 
identifying the effect of ALMP as a whole do not seem to be satisfied.
35 
Table C.3: Treatment intensity and ALMP composition in the local labour markets 
        Allocation to programme types among the treated (in %)  Sc 















subsidy  other A B
1  SO-BE  76  67  8.9  -3.9  13 46 39  1  29 31 40  0     
2  SO-BE  68  63  5.6  -3.9  20 35 45  1  18 39 43  0  x x
3 SO-BL  52 63 -11.2  -4.8  29  1  66  4  24  24  52  0     
4  SO-AG  64  68  -3.4  -5.1  19 29 51  1  34 30 35  0     
5  NE-BE  55  65  -10.0 -3.2  21 42 36  1  27 27 46  0     
6  NE-BE  59  67  -8.4  -3.2  23 39 37  1  45 21 30  3     
7  BE-AG  64  68  -4.9  -1.2  17 37 46  0  24 39 36  1    x
8  BE-FR  65  67  -1.7  -0.2  28 33 39  0  28 38 33  1  x x
9  FR-VD  74  59  15.0  3.0  30 20 48  1  27 16 56  2  x x
10  FR-VD  64  60  3.3  3.0  31 30 37  2  21 38 40  1    x
11  VD-GE  57  50  6.5  0.8  41 12 46  1  40 10 48  2  x x
12  VD-VS  59  66  -6.7  -0.7  33 20 46  1  23 33 43  1    x
13  BL-BS  67  53  14.2  2.1  34 22 44  0  25 22 52  1    x
14  LU-AG  62  68  -6.3  -1.2  46 25 27  1  24 39 36  1     
15 LU-NWOW  64  62  2.4 -10.4 46 21 32  1  39 21 40  1    x
16  LU-ZG  64  64  -0.2  -1.5  46 21 32  1  38 23 38  1    x
17  SZ-UR  69  61  8.8  -1.3  41 38 21  0  34 35 31  0    x
18  SZ-ZG  69  64  5.0  4.7  41 38 21  0  38 23 38  1     
19  AG-ZH  64  58  6.6  3.5  49 15 35  1  38 14 47  1    x
20  ZH-SH  53  63  -9.6  1.2  31 15 54  0  46 18 36  0     
21  ZH-TG  59  69  -9.9  -1.8  38 19 43  1  34 26 40  0  x x
22  ZH-SG  56  60  -3.8  -4.5  51 12 35  1  45 13 42  0  x x
23  ZH-SZ  56  72  -15.2 -8.5  51 12 35  1  49 20 31  0  x x
24  TG-SH  69  63  6.3  3.1  34 26 40  0  46 18 36  0    x
25  TG-SG  64  66  -1.5  -2.7  44 19 37  0  44 15 39  1  x x
26  SG-AR  61  64  -2.9  -5.1  47 12 40  1 8  38 54  0     
27  AR-AI 64  64 -0.5  -2.6  8  38  54 0 56  0  44 0     
28  SG-SZ  60  72  -11.4 -3.9  45 13 42  0  49 20 31  0    x
29  SG-GR  65  59  5.6  2.3  48 12 39  1  27 20 50  2     
30  GR-TI  52  57  -4.6  3.4  42 21 34  3  25 27 47  2     
Note:  a The estimate of the fraction of compliers is the difference between the previous two columns. 
b Difference in the instrument quota per unemployed (Table 2.1, column 5) between the two cantons.  
c Selection A contains only labour markets with maximum divergence between the programme type compositions ≤ 7. 
For selection B the maximum divergence is ≤13. 
                                                           
34 The threshold was set to 13, since there was no local labour market with maximum divergence of 14. 
35  If we were to impose more structural assumptions, these labour markets could also be useful for disentangling the 
effects of training, employment programmes and temporary wage subsidies.  63
Table C.4 shows the municipality sizes for the local labour markets, which are used to define urban regions 
in Section 5.3. In the columns on the left, the average municipality size is given for each local labour mar-
ket, while the columns on the right show the maximum municipality size. The minimum is not shown, as it 
is almost always 500 residents. These sizes are calculated from the municipalities belonging to the REO in 
this labour market, separately for the two sides of the border. The average size is computed as the size of 
the municipality weighted by the number of observations (in the dataset) residing in this municipality. 
Hence, it is self-weighted by the unemployed population. Since the size of the municipality was coded in 
intervals, the interval-midpoints are used as an approximation to the true municipality size (see note below 
Table C.4).  64
Table C.4: Size of municipalities in the local labour markets 
    Average municipality size (1'000 residents)  Maximum municipality size (1'000 residents) 
    In the one canton  In the other canton  In the one canton  In the other canton 
1  SO-BE  12.8 37.0 15.0 75.0 
2 SO-BE  6.3  6.5  15.0  15.0 
3  SO-BL  3.0 2.0 7.5 3.5 
4 SO-AG  7.3  7.1  15.0  15.0 
5  NE-BE  22.9 4.3 40.0 7.5 
6  NE-BE  20.2 2.3 40.0 3.5 
7  BE-AG  7.6  5.8 15.0 7.5 
8  BE-FR  81.2  16.9 150.0 40.0 
9  FR-VD  1.9 0.6 3.5 1.5 
10  FR-VD  1.5 4.2 3.5 7.5 
11 VD-GE  6.5  85.3  15.0  150.0 
12 VD-VS  9.2  8.8  15.0  15.0 
13  BL-BS  12.9 143.9 15.0 150.0 
14  LU-AG  3.0 5.8 7.5 7.5 
15 LU-NWOW  35.4 4.0 75.0 7.5 
16  LU-ZG  35.4 12.6 75.0 25.0 
17  SZ-UR  7.9  4.1 15.0 7.5 
18  SZ-ZG  7.9  12.6 15.0 25.0 
19 AG-ZH  8.0  12.6  15.0  300.0 
20  ZH-SH  1.6 26.3 3.5 40.0 
21 ZH-TG  60.8  5.6  300.0  15.0 
22 ZH-SG  12.4  7.4  300.0  15.0 
23  ZH-SZ  12.4  5.2 300.0 7.5 
24  TG-SH  5.6  26.3 15.0 40.0 
25 TG-SG  7.6  7.8  15.0  15.0 
26  SG-AR  44.9 7.3 75.0  15.0 
27  AR-AI  7.3  3.3 15.0 3.5 
28  SG-SZ  7.4  5.2 15.0 7.5 
29  SG-GR  4.2 20.2 7.5 40.0 
30  GR-TI  0.9 8.4 1.5  15.0 
Note: Since municipality size was coded in brackets, interval midpoints are used in the calculations: 500 (for bracket <1'000 resi-
dents), 1'500 (for bracket 1'000-2'000 residents), 3'500 (for 2'000-5'000 residents), 7'500 (for 5'000-10'000), 15'000 (for 
10'000-20'000), 25'000 (for 20'000-30'000), 40'000 (for 30'000-50'000), 75'000 (for 50'000-100'000), 150'000 (for 
100'000-200'000), 300'000 (for > 200'000). 
Appendix D: Additional estimation results 
Table D.1 displays the estimation results for the 30 local labour markets when using the Wald estimator, 
instead of the Fuller estimator (as in Table 5.1).  65
Table D.1: Wald estimates of the local average treatment effects for the 30 local labour markets 
    Wald estimates for year 1999 
  Region  Employment (in %-points)  High earnings (in %-points)  Labour earnings in CHF 
   May-Aug.  Sept.-Dec.  May-Aug.  Sept.-Dec.  May-Aug.  Sept.-Dec. 
1  SO-BE  3  -14 -27 -40 940 180 
2 SO-BE  -166  -114  -77  -50  -5'400  -3'270 
3 SO-BL  18  34  0  -9  -430  -200 
4  SO-AG  -4  -57 -15 -40  -3'350  -5'960 
5  NE-BE  51 69 75 96  2'010  940 
6 NE-BE  0  -6  14  24  710  -740 
7 BE-AG  -261  -191  -62  -41  -5'050  -3'460 
8 BE-FR  -244  -145  12  68  -5'550  -3'070 
9  FR-VD  92 44 66 47  3'500  1'960 
10  FR-VD  59  119 132 150  7'840  10'640 
11 VD-GE  108  163  62  89  8'420  10'140 
12  VD-VS  88 87 54 39  1'390  1'090 
13 BL-BS  -5  5  21  10  1'660  1'710 
14  LU-AG  -152 -114 -129 -119  -6'550  -6'050 
15  LU-NWOW  -340 -414 -188 -304  -20'170  -25'590 
16  LU-ZG -2'406  -1'426  -103  678  113'490 131'530 
17 SZ-UR  -20  -80  20  -1  -1'520  -4'680 
18  SZ-ZG  8  -36 -21 -67  -8'790  -10'680 
19  AG-ZH  17 16 57 71  -260  -110 
20  ZH-SH  -40 -73 -26 -52  -6'130  -7'300 
21 ZH-TG  38  17  2  -11  210  -470 
22 ZH-SG  6  -105  4  -74  -7'420  -10'830 
23 ZH-SZ  16  9  1  -2  -680  -1'020 
24  TG-SH  66 80 15 34  2'650  2'660 
25  TG-SG  -8 -104 -8 -154  6'240  -290 
26 SG-AR  50  2  53  74  8'210  10'480 
27 AR-AI  1'400  206  187  -431  38'700  12'730 
28 SG-SZ  20  47  0  22  1'600  2'290 
29 SG-GR  -110  -134  -58  -28  -6'700  -4'820 
30  GR-TI  -290 -40 -179 -24  -12'800  -4'250 
Note:   See note below Table 5.1. 
Table D.2 gives the estimation results for the aggregated LATE for Selection A (analogously to Table 5.2). 
The first rows give the estimated weights, which were estimated separately for each outcome variable. The 
local labour markets 21 and 23 receive about 70% of the weights, while the remaining weights are spread 
relatively evenly among the other labour markets.
36 The estimation results indicate a positive effect of par-
ticipation in ALMP on employment prospects. The probability of being employed is increased by 14 to 26 
percentage points, with only the larger of these two estimates being significantly different from zero. Also 
the effect on being employed with at least 90% of previous earnings is positive, but insignificant. In Table 
                                                           
36 The covariance matrix  ˆ Σ  is estimated through 10'000 bootstrap replications, and its inverse is shown in Table D.3.  66
D.2 the Quantiles Q0.005, Q0.025 and Q0.05 are shown instead of Q0.95, Q0.975 and Q0.995 when the estimated ef-
fect is negative. 
Table D.2: Aggregated treatment effect for compliers, Selection A 
  Outcome variables, year 1999 
  Employment (in %-points)  High earnings (in %-points)  Labour earnings in CHF 
  May-Aug. Sept.-Dec. May-Aug. Sept.-Dec. May-Aug. Sept.-Dec. 
weights  (%)        
BE-FR  2 4 7 6 6 8 
FR-VD  8 9 7 9  11  11 
VD-GE 9  6  11  10  4  4 
ZH-TG  19 21 19 20 24 23 
ZH-SG  5 2 5 4 2 1 
ZH-SZ  50 52 44 47 46 44 
TG-SG  8 6 8 5 7  10 
        
        
Estimate 26.4  14.2  10.3  6.0  214  -250 
Std.error  11.3 10.9 10.8 11.4 629  612 
t-value  2.33 1.30 0.95 0.53 0.34 0.41 
        
Bootstrap of estimate with fixed weights  
Q0.05 / Q0.95  20.6 21.5 18.2 20.2 1'061  -917 
Q0.025 / Q0.975 24.5 25.0 21.7 24.0 1'255  -1'126 
Q0.005 / Q0.995  32.1 32.5 29.9 31.5 1'668  -1'566 
    
Bootstrap of estimate with stochastic weights 
Q0.05 / Q0.95  14.3 16.5 12.6 14.9 767 -849 
Q0.025 / Q0.975  16.2 20.4 17.0 17.7 966  -1'028 
Q0.005 / Q0.995 20.1 24.6 21.3 21.9 1'451  -1'435 
        
Bootstrap of t-value with fixed weights 
Q0.05 / Q0.95  1.53 1.71 1.38 1.52 1.49 1.31 
Q0.025 / Q0.975  1.72 2.00 1.63 1.83 1.75 1.55 
Q0.005 / Q0.995 2.11 2.31 1.94 2.18 2.20 2.12 
        
Bootstrap of t-value with stochastic weights 
Q0.05 / Q0.95  1.22 1.56 1.17 1.31 1.24 1.38 
Q0.025 / Q0.975  1.36 1.78 1.44 1.54 1.47 1.61 
Q0.005 / Q0.995 1.75 2.19 1.94 2.11 2.28 2.05 
Note:   Estimation of stderror based on 10'000 bootstrap replications. Quantiles of estimate with fixed weights based on 10'000 
replications. The other quantiles are estimated by double bootstrapping and only based on 1'000 replications in inner 
bootstrap and 1'000 replications in outer bootstrap. Aggregated LATE for labour markets 8, 9, 11, 21, 22, 23, 25.  67
Table D.3: Inverse of covariance matrix for aggregated treatment effect for compliers, Selection A 
Outcome variable: Employment May-Aug. 1999    Outcome variable: Employment Sept.-Dec. 1999 
1.75 0.06 -0.06 -0.01 0.03 -0.10 -0.01    3.41 0.08 -0.07 0.09 0.02 -0.11 0.00 
0.06 5.87 -0.06  -0.01 0.01 0.12 -0.04    0.08 7.53 -0.05  -0.04  -0.07 0.28 0.02 
-0.06  -0.06 6.69 0.15 -0.07 0.09 0.03    -0.07  -0.05 4.68 0.21 -0.03 0.07 -0.01 
-0.01 -0.01 0.15 14.93 0.02 -0.13 0.00    0.09 -0.04 0.21 17.37 0.08 -0.28 0.00 
0.03 0.01 -0.07 0.02 7.12 -3.25 -0.17    0.02 -0.07 -0.03 0.08 4.13 -2.13 -0.07 
-0.10  0.12  0.09  -0.13 -3.25 42.35 -0.14    -0.11  0.28  0.07  -0.28 -2.13 45.68 0.05 
-0.01 -0.04 0.03 0.00 -0.17 -0.14 6.58    0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.00 -0.07 0.05 5.17 
               
Outcome variable: High earnings May-Aug. 1999    Outcome variable: High earnings Sept.-Dec. 1999 
6.08 -0.06 -0.04 -0.11 0.02 -0.11 0.08    4.86 -0.04 -0.03 -0.17 -0.03 0.06 0.04 
-0.06 6.22 -0.01 0.09 -0.03 0.06 -0.02    -0.04 6.70 -0.05 0.06 -0.02 0.10 0.02 
-0.04 -0.01 8.77 0.18 -0.05 0.17 -0.04    -0.03 -0.05 7.16 0.15 -0.07 0.24 -0.02 
-0.11 0.09  0.18 16.37 0.19 -0.37 -0.01    -0.17 0.06  0.15 15.81 0.13 -0.46 -0.13 
0.02 -0.03 -0.05 0.19  6.69 -2.99 0.03    -0.03 -0.02 -0.07 0.13  5.11 -2.42 -0.01 
-0.11  0.06  0.17  -0.37 -2.99 40.71 -0.12    0.06  0.10  0.24  -0.46 -2.42 38.55 0.05 
0.08 -0.02 -0.04 -0.01 0.03 -0.12 6.50    0.04 0.02 -0.02 -0.13 -0.01 0.05 4.02 
               
Outcome variable: Labour earnings May-Aug. 1999    Outcome variable: Labour earnings Sept.-Dec. 1999 
0.16 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    0.21 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.26 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00    0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00    0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.00 0.01 0.00 0.62 0.00 -0.02 0.00    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.62 0.00 -0.02 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 -0.07 0.00    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 -0.04 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.07 1.25 -0.01    0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.02 -0.04 1.22 0.00 
0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -0.01 0.19    0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.26 
Note:   Inverse of estimated covariance matrix of  ˆ θ . 